Multilateral development banking for this century’s development challenges: five recommendations to shareholders of the old and new multilateral development banks by Ahluwalia, Montek Singh et al.
Multilateral development banking for this century’s development 
challenges: five recommendations to shareholders of the old and new 
multilateral development banks
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102432/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Ahluwalia, Montek Singh, Summers, Lawrence, Velasco, Andres, Birdsall, Nancy 
and Morris, Scott (2016) Multilateral development banking for this century’s 
development challenges: five recommendations to shareholders of the old and 
new multilateral development banks. . Center for Global Development, 
Washington, DC. ISBN 9781944691028 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial (CC BY-NC) licence. This licence allows you to remix, tweak, and build 
upon this work non-commercially, and any new works must also acknowledge the authors 
and be non-commercial. You don’t have to license any derivative works on the same 
terms. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
Multilateral Development Banking 
for This Century’s Development Challenges
Five Recommendations to Shareholders of the Old and New Multilateral Development Banks
Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Lawrence Summers, and Andrés Velasco, Chairs 
Nancy Birdsall and Scott Morris, Project Directors
Copyright ©2016 by the Center for Global Development
Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial 3.0
Co-chairs
Montek Singh Ahluwalia
Lawrence H. Summers
Andrés Velasco
Panel members
Caroline Anstey
Afsaneh Beschloss
Christopher Elias
Arminio Fraga
Enrique Iglesias
Takatoshi Ito
Donald Kaberuka
Caio Koch-Weser
Justin Lin
Ray Offenheiser*
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
Guillermo Ortiz
Maria Ramos
Dani Rodrik
Andrew Sheng
Ngaire Woods
Co-directors
Nancy Birdsall 
Scott Morris
High Level Panel on the Future of 
Multilateral Development Banking
* Mr. Offenheiser has offered a dissenting opinion, which can be found at the end of this report.
Contents
Acknowledgements vi
Abbreviations vii
Executive summary ix
Introduction 1
A 20th century success story 1
A changing landscape 2
Chapter 1 Global public goods: A clear mandate with core financing 5
The challenge 5
Our recommendations 7
Chapter 2 Increased investment in sustainable infrastructure 14
The challenge 14
Our recommendations 15
Chapter 3 Beyond business as usual on concessional financing 19
The challenge 19
Our recommendations 19
Chapter 4 Crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction 22
The challenge 22
Our recommendations 22
Chapter 5 A shareholder-led MDB agenda 25
The challenge: Governance and beyond 25
Note of dissent from Ray Offenheiser 27
Appendix 1 MDBs and development-relevant global public goods 29
Global public goods that are development-relevant 29
DR-GPGs for which the MDBs have special competence 29
Spending on DR-GPGs 30
Current World Bank programs in support of development-relevant GPGs 31
v
C
o
n
te
n
ts
A DR-GPG window at the World Bank 33
Appendix 2 MDB balance sheet optimization: The Asian Development
Bank case and its implications for the World Bank 35
Implications for future World Bank financing for DR-GPGs 36
Governance implications 37
Appendix 3 MDB private sector activities 39
Appendix 4 Concessional MDB lending for the poor 41
Appendix 5 MDB safeguards 43
Appendix 6 Governance picture at the MDBs 47
References 53
Figures 
1 Public sources of finance to developing countries 2
2 A new DR-GPG window: Financing and deploying $10 billion a year 12
3 MDB investments by instrument 18
A1.1 Annual trust fund contributions 2006–15, including DR-GPG share 33
A2.1 Effect of leveraging IDA resources 36
A2.2 Changes in voting share under combined capital compared with IBRD shareholding, by constituency 38
A3.1 Private sector share of annual business volume 39
A4.1 Median income vs. GNI per capita 42
A5.1 Loan approval times at select MDBs 45
A5.2 Fraction of original commitment disbursed 46
Tables
1 IFI financial flows, fiscal years 2009–10 (US$ billions) 23
A1.1 Actual and planned budget allocation for the World Bank’s grant-making facilities 32
A2.1 Equity stock of the World Bank and AsDB 35
A2.2 IDA graduation projections 37
A3.1 Private sector activity and profitability, average 2011–14 (US$ millions) 40
A4.1 Number of countries eligible for World Bank lending by income classification, FY16 41
A5.1 Categorical prohibitions in MDBs safeguard operational policies 43
A6.1 Top five shareholders in major MDBs by voting power, 2014 47
A6.2 Governance 48
A6.3 Presidency 50
vi
The project directors wish to thank the panel for their work, 
insights, and spirit of cooperation in coming together on this 
report. We also wish to acknowledge the excellent research 
support provided by Priscilla Agyapong, Anna Diofasi, and 
Madeleine Gleave. We also wish to acknowledge Devesh Kapur 
and Andrew Rogerson for their contributions as advisors to 
the project and Angus Deaton for his insights and construc-
tive feedback throughout the project. All of these individu-
als made important contributions to the panel’s work but do 
not endorse the report and its recommendations as panelists.
The Center for Global Development is grateful for contribu-
tions from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Swed-
ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, our board of directors, and our 
general funders in support of this work.
Acknowledgments
vii
AfDB African Development Bank
AfDF African Development Fund
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AsDB Asian Development Bank
AsDF Asian Development Fund
CAF Andean Development Corporation–
Development Bank of Latin America
CGIAR Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research
CPI Climate Policy Initiative
CTF Clean Technology Fund
DfID Department for International Development
DR-GPGs Development-relevant global public goods
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development
EIB European Investment Bank
FAO Food & Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations
FCAS Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
EIB European Investment Bank
GEF Global Environment Facility
GMF  Grant-making facility
GNI Gross national income
GPG Global public good
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development
IBRSD International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Sustainable Development
ICP International Comparison Program
IDA International Development Association
IEG Independent Evaluation Group
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFIs International Financial Institutions 
IMF International Monetary Fund
IsDB Islamic Development Bank
MDBs Multilateral development banks
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
NDB New Development Bank
NGO Nongovernmental organization
ODA Official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
R&D Research and development
RDBs Regional development banks
SIDS Small island developing states
WBG World Bank Group
WHO World Health Organization
Abbreviations

ix
The multilateral development banks (MDBs) emerged as one 
of the international community’s great success stories of the 
post–World War II era. Set up to address a market failure in 
long-term capital flows to post-conflict Europe and developing 
countries, they combined financial heft and technical knowl-
edge for more than five decades to support their borrowing 
members’ investments in post-conflict reconstruction, growth 
stimulation, and poverty reduction.
However, the geo-economic landscape has changed dra-
matically in this century, and with it the demands and needs 
of the developing world. Developing countries now make up 
half of the global economy. The capital market failure that 
originally motivated the MDBs is less acute. Almost all devel-
oping countries now rely primarily on domestic resources to 
manage public investment, and some of the poorest countries 
can borrow abroad on their own. Similarly, growth and the 
globalization of professional expertise on development practice 
have eroded whatever near-monopoly of advisory services the 
MDBs once had. 
At the same time, new challenges call for global collective 
action and financing of the sort the MDBs are well suited to 
provide but have been handicapped in doing so effectively. 
The list goes beyond major financial shocks, where the IMF’s 
role is clear—ranging from climate change, pandemic risk, 
increasing resistance to antibiotics, and poor management of 
international migration flows and of displaced and refugee 
populations. Other areas include the cross-border security and 
spillovers associated with growing competition for water and 
other renewable natural resources, and, with climate change, 
an increase in the frequency and human costs of weather and 
other shocks in low-income countries that are poorly equipped 
to respond. 
The World Bank has stepped in with emergency financing 
for some areas—the Ebola and Syrian refugee crises in the 
last year—and the MDBs have had special financing from 
some donors earmarked to deal with climate change. But the 
MDBs as a group, built around the country loan as their key 
product, have had neither the core mandate nor the type and 
volume of financing to go beyond modest ad hoc responses 
to these new challenges. 
In addition, the global economy may be entering more 
than a brief period of demand-limited low growth and secular 
stagnation. In much of the developing world, high debt and 
fiscal constraints are reducing investment in power, roads, 
ports, and other public infrastructure—just when continuing 
growth of the working age population makes infrastructure 
critical to poverty-reducing growth, and just as the opportu-
nity for innovation in climate-friendly infrastructure could 
help restart sustainable and sustained global growth. Though 
developing countries recovered reasonably well following the 
2008–10 global financial crisis—especially relative to high-
income countries—much of that growth relied on low global 
interest rates and a commodity boom driven largely by China’s 
demands. The risk of stalled growth all over the world as we 
write this report is a reminder that the development successes 
of the last five decades—including dramatic reductions in 
material poverty, illiteracy, and infant mortality, and rapid 
growth of emerging market economies resulting in conver-
gence toward rich-country incomes and a dramatic reduction 
in global inequality—relied heavily on economic growth in 
the developing world. But its continuation cannot be taken 
for granted. 
These new and urgent challenges—including a restart of 
the healthy rates of economic growth that are at the heart 
of the MDBs’ contribution to the globally agreed sustain-
able development goals—have in common disproportionate 
risks and benefits for the developing world, and a particular 
need to combine financing, technical and country expertise, 
and a coordinated international policy response. The MDBs 
may no longer hold a monopoly on financing, expertise, and 
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coordination, but they remain uniquely suited to combine 
these assets to deal with new and diverse challenges. In short, 
if the MDBs no longer existed today, the international com-
munity would have to reinvent them. 
By some measures, the MDBs today are not only existing 
but thriving, with demand for their financing and services 
growing. But this picture belies a critical need for reinvention 
if they are to rise to meet today’s pressing challenges effectively. 
In particular, the legacy MDBs—the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), Asian Development 
Bank (AsDB), African Development Bank (AfDB), and Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)—
have been slow to adjust to many of today’s realities, starting 
with the increasing economic role and growing capability of 
their borrowers. For example, their major shareholders have 
agreed to only minimal adjustments in corporate governance 
systems and leadership selection, creating tensions with major 
borrowers who want more voice and influence over their poli-
cies and operations. With age, MDBs have become bogged 
down in bureaucracy, increasing delays and raising costs to 
borrowers, particularly for major infrastructure projects. Per-
haps in frustration, China and other major borrowers have 
taken leadership in creating two new MDBs focused heavily 
on infrastructure: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB).
There was an urgency to the founding of the first MDB 
more than 70 years ago. As much as the global landscape 
has changed, a new urgency has arisen today that calls for 
more robust, flexible, and effective multilateral responses to 
an unprecedented set of development challenges. Yet, at the 
very moment when new and pressing challenges call for multi-
lateral responses, there are troubling signs of a retreat from 
multilateralism, as evidenced in the Brexit vote and a broader 
political backlash in many Western democracies.
In the midst of this uncertainty, we call for a new embrace 
of the MDB system. In this report, we call on the shareholders 
of the large legacy banks and the two new multilateral banks 
to repurpose the MDB system in line with these changes. We 
hope our concerns and recommendations also have relevance 
for smaller regional and subregional MDBs not specifically 
mentioned in this report.
We recommend that the shareholders of the seven major 
MDBs treat these global challenges not in the incremental and 
piecemeal manner that has become the habit of the last sev-
eral decades, but instead as a system for the whole to be more 
effective than the sum of its parts. The system should hold in 
common the key principles of transparency, accountability, 
and sustainability. But specific roles and mandates across the 
MDBs should vary to recognize their inherent differences in 
comparative advantage, particularly between the World Bank 
and the regional MDBs.
Recognizing the growing global premium on environmen-
tal sustainability in a climate-challenged world, we call on 
member governments of the World Bank to take the first 
step in that direction by renaming the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Sustainable Development 
(IBRSD)—and to reshape its mission accordingly, toward 
leadership on issues of the global commons or global public 
goods that are squarely in the development domain and require 
a global shareholder base to respond collectively. Shareholders 
should in turn look to the regional MDBs to take leadership 
in supporting the new imperative of sustainable development 
through country and regional operations across all sectors, 
but particularly in increasing investment in infrastructure 
that takes into account the logic of low-carbon and climate-
resilient economies in the developing world.
In line with this approach to differentiated roles within 
an MDB system, the panel makes five recommendations to 
better realize the MDB system’s potential for meeting today’s 
development challenges: 
Recommendation 1. Global public goods. An explicit 
new mandate for the World Bank should promote global 
public goods critical to development as its major priority, 
through the creation of a new financing window or fund 
with a separate governance structure and a target of deploy-
ing $10 billion in grant resources annually within the next 
five years. Resources would be directed to selected programs 
with substantial spillovers at the global level, primarily in 
agriculture, energy/climate, health, and development policy 
data and research that cannot easily be structured or priced 
as traditional country operations. The funds would be chan-
neled as grants, including to other institutions (say, for country 
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price data to allow purchasing power parity estimations); and 
as subsidies to select lending operations, including those of 
other MDBs, for which borrowers cannot be expected to bear 
the full costs (as for renewable power where coal is cheap). To 
finance this new mandate, in addition to possible member 
capital and cash contributions, shareholders should call for 
a new business model at the World Bank, leveraging future 
International Development Association (IDA) reflows to free 
substantial resources for the new grant window. 
Recommendation 2. Sustainable infrastructure. In 
response to today’s compelling development and climate 
imperatives, shareholders should support a substantial increase 
in financing sustainable infrastructure by the MDBs over the 
next decade. A reasonable target is to reach $200 billion a year 
from current levels of about $50 billion, taking into account 
any increased financial capability at the two new banks. The 
joint response should be anchored by rebranding the IBRD as 
the IBRSD, with World Bank infrastructure lending devoted 
exclusively to developing and financing green investment. Any 
increases in capital to allow this scaling up of infrastructure, 
presumably primarily at the regional banks, should be cali-
brated by shareholders based on each bank’s performance in 
financing productive, efficient, and green investments. All 
performance should be assessed for the effective use of the 
full range of financial instruments and policy conditions—
and in the power sector, the maximum crowding in of private 
investment.
Recommendation 3. Beyond business-as-usual on 
concessional financing. Shareholders should commit to 
maintain current levels of concessional support across all 
MDBs, implying at least $25 billion in concessional lend-
ing annually over the next decade (and possibly more given 
the possible additional amounts the AIIB might provide on 
concessional terms). As a growing number of countries gradu-
ate from concessional assistance to non-concessional borrow-
ing and other forms of engagement with MDBs, this baseline 
commitment should allow for increased support in the remain-
ing poor countries, and for allocation of concessional fund-
ing to countries in crisis and to post-conflict reconstruction, 
especially at the World Bank (see Recommendation 4). In 
addition, given the expected concentration of poor countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, there should be a shift in concessional 
financing from the World Bank to the AfDB over the same 
period, so that the African-based institution eventually 
becomes the leading MDB in these countries. 
Recommendation 4. Crisis management and post-
conflict reconstruction. Shareholders should formalize and 
sustain a commitment to provide resources on concessional 
terms (whether directly or through insurance and other con-
tingent arrangements), particularly at the World Bank and 
in middle-income countries. That would enable the MDBs, 
in coordination with relevant UN agencies and other critical 
service providers, to respond rapidly and flexibly to short-run 
humanitarian needs associated with unexpected shocks (such 
as pandemics, natural disasters, and increases in displaced and 
refugee populations) in a manner that takes into account long-
run development implications. It would also allow MDBs to 
respond with concessional funding for a first round of post-
conflict investments in reconstruction. Better responses to 
crises in middle-income countries also require ex ante agree-
ment on flexibility in rules around country eligibility and 
the blending of concessional and non-concessional resources. 
Recommendation 5. A shareholder-led MDB agenda. 
Shareholders of the major MDBs should agree to convene 
every five years at the level of governors to engage in a cross-
MDB review of resources and policy. The first four recom-
mendations require shareholders to make new demands on 
each of the MDBs for flexibility and effectiveness and to set 
new standards of accountability for their respective manage-
ments. The changes in respective roles of the different banks 
will be realized only if the shareholders together manage a 
strategic approach to a cross-MDB agenda at the ministerial 
level over the next decade—on such issues as the changing rela-
tive resource needs of the different banks, their performance 
relative to each other, and the evolution of their comparative 
advantages. The shareholders should also commit to fully 
implement the governance reforms proposed for the World 
Bank by the Zedillo Commission in 2009, and carry these 
reforms forward where relevant in the other MDBs. 
The ambition in this report is considerable. We simulta-
neously call for sustaining such current MDB activities as 
concessional support for poor countries, embracing a new 
GPG mandate, and increasing support for sustainable infra-
structure. We show that it is possible to meet this ambition 
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in the years ahead without increasing the financial burden on 
shareholders, without resorting to boosting assistance for one 
group of countries at the expense of another group. 
Indeed, we see a unique moment for the MDBs to embrace 
ambition as win-win-win. The successes of MDB borrowers 
mean less reliance on donor-supported grant financing and 
more access to leveraged finance. More reliance on leverage 
within the MDBs in turn means more scope to devote grant 
resources to compelling development-relevant global public 
good activities and to preparedness for major crises with long-
term development implications. 
Critically, however, getting to this win-win-win depends 
on the will and strategic vision of shareholders to shift course 
now. Our goal for the MDBs is that they become newly rel-
evant and vital for all shareholders. For low-income countries, 
particularly in fragile environments, this will mean a stable 
and sustained flow of resources, with a continuing search for 
new modes of engagement where the evidence shows that 
conventional aid has not been effective. For middle-income 
and emerging market countries, it will mean more targeted 
and flexible financing, stronger emphasis on catalyzing pri-
vate domestic and foreign investment, and greater use of and 
support for countries’ domestic capital markets, and in the 
area of sustainable infrastructure, more demonstrated tech-
nical expertise—whether tied to lending or not. And for all 
shareholders, particularly the large ones (borrower and non-
borrower alike), it will mean a clear embrace of an agenda 
centered on today’s global challenges in areas such as climate 
change and pandemics.
A growing class of shareholders do not fall into conven-
tional MDB categories. Some are no longer major borrowers 
from any of the banks (Chile, South Korea). Some are not 
members of the G-7 or the G20 (Norway, Kuwait). Some are 
both donors and recipients, borrowers and non-borrowers 
(Brazil, China). Their engagement stands as a test of the MDB 
system’s ability to spur and sustain collective action in support 
of a new agenda over the next decade. If countries like Chile 
or Norway, for example, no longer see value in their MDB 
relationships, the system as a whole will ultimately suffer. So, 
while our agenda can be adopted by the major shareholders of 
each bank, it is an agenda for all of the shareholders.
In the end, we strongly believe that the MDB model—com-
bining technical and financial capacity in a politically backed 
cooperative—remains the best available vehicle for tackling 
the critical new challenges facing the global community. 
1Introduction
A 20th century success story
The launch of the World Bank at Bretton Woods in 1944 
responded to an immediate need to rebuild a war-torn Europe. 
The bank’s first loan to France of $250 million ($3.2 billion 
in today’s dollars) funded the equipment, fuel, and raw mate-
rials that would drive the country’s reconstruction.1 In fact, 
helping countries rebuild after war and conflict has always 
been an essential MDB function—whether in post-conflict 
Japan, South Korea, Bosnia after the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
post-conflict Liberia a decade ago, or Côte d’Ivoire and South 
Sudan today.
Over subsequent decades, the MDBs’ role has extended 
well beyond rebuilding efforts. China’s decision to seek World 
Bank assistance starting in 1980 and Asian Development Bank 
(AsDB) assistance in 1986 resulted in a remarkably productive 
30-year MDB partnership. Chinese officials have character-
ized the MDB role as catalytic in promoting a reform agenda 
that lifted nearly 700 million people out of extreme poverty 
in just three decades.2 The collapse of the Soviet Union saw 
the MDBs move aggressively to help drive the transition to 
market economies in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly 
through the creation of a new MDB, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), in 1991.
The larger story is the role of the MDBs in fostering ideas, 
policies, and large-scale programs, often complementing and 
building on the macroeconomic reforms supported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), that have been good 
for growth and resulted in large gains in living standards 
around the world. The World Bank put poverty reduction 
on the global agenda, supported the agricultural research that 
1. World Bank 2016.
2. See video comments of Jin Liqun, former Vice Minister, Ministry of 
Finance, PRC, in China and World Bank.
led to the Green Revolution, worked with the World Health 
Organization and others to eradicate river blindness in West 
Africa, encouraged targeted cash transfer programs, helped 
governments liberalize input and crop prices with minimal 
disruption to agriculture, sponsored analysis of the economic 
returns to educating girls, and helped build local capital mar-
kets and minimize countries’ currency risks through their 
own financing.3 
The regional development banks have been increasingly 
active partners in these initiatives, particularly in supporting 
regional trade agreements and fostering cross-border infra-
structure and power to expand regional markets. 
Finally, the legacy MDBs, and especially the World Bank, 
have become the trusted home (given their fiduciary and 
legal capacity as well as staff expertise on particular issues) 
of thousands of trust funds supported by donors for special 
purposes—from impact evaluation to climate finance, learning 
assessments, piloting new ideas in aid delivery (output-based 
aid), and the rollout of programs supported by a mix of phil-
anthropic and western donors such as the Advance Market 
Commitment, which creates a “market” for pharmaceutical 
products that treat diseases primarily affecting the poor.4
Successes of the past reflect the particular combination of 
assets the MDBs bring together: not only financial resources, 
but technical depth across a wide range of economic and social 
issues, country knowledge, and fiduciary and legal capacity. All 
of these elements have been brought to bear in MDB policy 
engagements with developing country governments, which 
over many decades helped spur growth and policy reform in 
the developing world.
All of this is not to suggest the World Bank and other 
MDBs have always been right on policies and effective on 
3. Clemens and Kremer 2016. 
4. Levine, Kremer, and Albright 2005.
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programs. Critics of the effects of World Bank adjustment 
programs on poverty and human development in the 1980s 
and 1990s have been largely vindicated by the independent 
reports of the bank’s evaluation arm, and independent reports 
on its research programs view those programs as adhering too 
often to support for orthodoxy over evidence.5,6,7Over the 
last two decades, the World Bank and the other MDBs have 
learned hard lessons from periods of controversy over policies 
and have not always gotten it right—which puts a premium 
on the continuing demands of the institutions’ supporters for 
transparency and accountability. In addition, reports from 
independent evaluators of the MDBs have highlighted prob-
lems in an array of operational, program, and policy areas, such 
as approaches to public sector reform that have shown few if 
any results, private sector investments that have crowded out 
5. Banerjee et al. 2006.
6. Easterly 2005.
7. World Bank 1992.
rather than crowded in other private capital, and operational 
safeguards that have made dealing with the banks too onerous. 
A changing landscape 
As central players in the global development effort, the MDBs 
and their shareholders can take pride in the tremendous prog-
ress that has been made. But we now enter an era that looks 
very different from the one in which these legacy MDBs—the 
World Bank and the major regional MDBs, the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, African 
Development Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development—were at the height of their influence. 
Two things have changed. First, the rapid growth of China 
and other major emerging markets in the last 25 years has 
altered dramatically the geoeconomic landscape. Borrowing 
member countries as a group now account for two-thirds of 
the global economy, and almost all rely more on their own 
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Figure 1: Public sources of finance to developing countries
Source: WDI, IMF World database.
Note: Domestic public resources only entail tax and nontax revenue as a 
fraction of GDP (IMF World Revenue Longitudinal Data); GDP figures 
from WDI database. International public resources entail net ODA and 
official aid received (WDI database). Figures were reported in current dol-
lars; conversions to constant dollars are authors’ calculations.
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domestic resources to finance their development than on the 
multilateral banks and other outside sources of public finance 
(Figure 1). The banks were established to address the market 
failure in long-term capital flows to poor countries. But in a 
world where lower income countries like Ghana and Tanzania 
are able to place 10-year sovereign bonds in the market at 6–7 
percent, that particular market failure is less acute. The change 
in relative influence and market access for many developing 
countries is reflected in the breakdown of the MDBs’ tradi-
tional demarcation between borrowing and non-borrowing 
countries. China, Brazil, Russia, and even India provide for-
eign aid to smaller, poorer countries. And China, for political 
as well as economic reasons, created the new Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank (AIIB), and along with Brazil, Russia, 
India and South Africa, the New Development Bank (NDB). 
Second, most developing countries now have access 
(whether domestically or internationally) to the kinds of 
advisory service, policy ideas, and practical examples of good 
practice that seemed to be a near monopoly of the MDBs for 
much of the late 20th century. On economic and social policy 
issues, developing countries today are less reliant on—and 
perhaps also, given the success of alternative models reflected 
in China, Singapore, and Rwanda, less confident in—the 
single-recipe approaches they see as having dominated the 
creditor-influenced legacy multilaterals.8,9 The MDBs are now 
one among many sources of ideas and advice competing for 
attention in the developing world, rather than the dominant 
source.
The legacy MDBs have adapted too slowly and minimally to 
the increasing economic role and growing sophistication and 
capability of their borrowers and to today’s development chal-
lenges. For example, they continue to rely predominantly on 
lending to sovereigns, except at the EBRD, where an emphasis 
on private sector development was established at the found-
ing. Their portfolio of cross-border loans is tiny in relation to 
needs, particularly for regional infrastructure, where there is 
greater complexity in negotiating an allocation of debt ser-
vice among borrowers. And they rarely exploit the full range 
8. Birdsall et al. 2010.
9. Rodrik 2009.
of instruments they have—grants, equity, guarantees, and 
policy leverage—to crowd in sustainable private investment. 
Why the slowness to adapt? One reason is that age and 
bureaucratic growth have taken their toll, particularly at the 
World Bank, where political pressures and the close scrutiny 
of NGOs have affected its operations by making traditional 
donors very—and perhaps excessively—risk averse to stories 
of corruption, waste, human rights abuses, and environmental 
injustices.10,11 In response to these pressures, the legacy MDBs 
have gradually become burdened with a proliferation of rules 
and processes that are meant to eliminate corruption and 
safeguard legitimate aims such as environmental and social 
protection, but that often fail to do so effectively or to serve 
the institutions’ broader development mission. The result is 
widespread borrower frustration with the hassle factor that 
increases the costs and delays of major infrastructure projects. 
Another reason is that adjustments in the legacy MDBs’ 
governance have been modest, with the largely western donor 
“creditors” dominating the official governance arrangements. 
Slow adjustments in governance, especially at the World 
Bank, have frustrated the political ambitions of emerging 
markets to assume greater leadership at the global level—
through increased capital participation, voting power, and 
influence on these and other operational issues that affect 
them as borrowers.
The initiative of China and other emerging markets to set 
up their own institutions—the AIIB and the NDB—reflects 
these two factors. At the same time, the new banks suggest the 
benefits of the MDB model. Compared with bilateral interac-
tions, the cooperative multilateral model leverages the public 
capital and voice of its major shareholders. It guards against 
the negative aspects of direct political influence that come 
with bilateral engagement. It allows for some consensus on 
shared social, environmental, and fiduciary standards. And it 
provides creditors and contributors with considerable policy 
influence for relatively limited financial backing. 
Given these trends, does it matter if the legacy MDBs con-
tinue more or less on a path of gradually declining influence, 
with the new MDBs essentially taking the same form under 
10. Mallaby 2006.
11. World Bank 2009.
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different leadership? CGD’s High-Level Panel on Multilateral 
Development Banking concludes that it does matter. The 
MDBs—for all their shortcomings in the current environ-
ment—may well be the best, and in some respects the only, 
vehicle the world has to tackle critical new challenges facing 
the global community. 
In the coming pages, we set out critical challenges to sus-
tainable global development that other existing institutions 
cannot readily assume: delivering global public goods, increas-
ing investment in sustainable infrastructure, supporting low-
income countries, and preventing and managing crises. We 
then elaborate on our five recommendations to MDB share-
holders for the necessary adjustments to enable the MDBs—
old and new, individually and as part of a larger system—to 
better take on those challenges. 
5The challenge 
We see a pressing need for greatly expanded support for a 
well-defined set of global public goods where the MDBs and 
particularly the World Bank should be contributing given 
their sectoral and financial capabilities: climate change, agri-
culture, health, and data relevant for development policy and 
programs. 
With greater global integration, developing countries face 
increasing risks over which they have little or no control, and 
which no one country, rich or poor, has the incentive to tackle 
alone.12 The most urgent such challenge is climate change—
an existential threat to the global fight against poverty, dis-
ease, and instability. Other challenges where all MDBs can 
play a critical role include pandemic prevention and man-
agement, food price volatility, resistance to antibiotics, loss 
of biodiversity, the effects of underpriced water and other 
shared natural resources on poverty and sustainable growth, 
and even unmanaged refugee and migration flows. These risks 
affect everyone, but are potentially catastrophic for the poor-
est people living in the most fragile states. Nor is it solely a 
matter of risks. There is the opportunity cost of failing to 
exploit opportunities to develop and disseminate new prod-
ucts and new ideas. Consider the high returns to the scientific 
revolution realized in the form of a smallpox vaccine and the 
Green Revolution—with benefits that extend beyond any 
one country.13 
12. We refer here not to everything the MDBs do and could do that is 
“global,” but to a more specific and narrowly defined set of “goods” whose 
benefits cannot be fully captured by any single donor, country, or investor 
and which are as a result particularly likely to be underfunded. Appendix 
1 covers what kinds of activities are and are not included in the limited set 
the Panel envisions where the MDBs should play a greater role.
13. Evenson, Waggoner, and Ruttan 1979.
Current funding of development-
relevant global public goods 
Our rough estimate of total GPG-related transfers to develop-
ing countries—excluding spending in the United States and 
other high-income countries on their own R&D infrastructure 
with many global spillovers—was about $14 billion a year, or 
just over 10 percent of spending on official development assis-
tance to benefit developing countries directly.14 The amount 
for 2015 could be greater by several billions, if recent pledges 
of donors to finance transfers to developing countries for cli-
mate mitigation have begun to disburse.15 More than half of 
the $14 billion figure, however, is in the form of contributions 
to UN peacekeeping, with additional amounts for IMF sur-
veillance and selected World Health Organization (WHO) 
activities, so as little as $7 billion a year has been disbursed 
for the development-relevant GPGs (DR-GPGs) where the 
MDBs could make a greater contribution.16 Tripling that 
number would not be sufficient to cover the funding called for 
to support climate mitigation alone in developing countries 
(for which the high-income countries promised $50 billion 
14. Birdsall and Diofasi 2015. 
15. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and 
Climate Policy Initiative (2015). The report shows commitments (not dis-
bursements) in 2014 of $62 billion; that figure includes pledges for climate 
adaptation, which we exclude above because of lack of global spillovers; 
see Appendix 1 for more detail on the large difference between the $62 
billion and the $7 billion figures.
16. We developed an alternative estimate for official funding of DR-GPGs 
in 2014 by adding up disbursements by both bilateral and multilateral 
donors in DR-GPG relevant sectors that are listed in the OECD’s Credit 
Reporting System, and cover areas including medical research, solar power 
generation and so forth; that number added up to $7 billion as well. 
Global public goods: A clear 
mandate with core financing
Chapter 1
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a year by 202017). As a single example, the figure on the table 
to address the global risk of growing resistance to antibiotics 
is $20 billion.18
Spending on DR-GPGs by major foundations is far smaller, 
though their leadership, particularly that of the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, has been important in defining 
issues and developing programs. Our very rough estimate is 
that the major foundations and other philanthropies have 
spent about $1.5 billion a year in the last five years on DR-
GPGs, including about $1 billion by the Gates Foundation 
on health, primarily for R&D on tropical diseases. Because 
the total resources of the major foundations are small rela-
tive to the needs they see, they are keen on working with and 
increasing the role of the MDBs.
In short, there is an enormous need for leadership in the 
funding of DR-GPGs including and beyond climate mitiga-
tion for the next decade and more. 
Funding of DR-GPGs at and through 
the World Bank Group
The World Bank is particularly well suited for raising and 
deploying financing for DR-GPGs—at the political level in 
raising and acting as a reliable conduit for resources, and at the 
technical level in setting priorities for use of those resources 
and their allocation across needs. It does so in a spirit of coop-
eration with other international institutions (WHO, FAO, 
Green Climate Fund, and the regional MDBs, especially in 
supporting the provision of regional public goods), the phil-
anthropic community, civil society, the private sector, and a 
growing number of mixed coalitions of official, nonprofit, and 
private parties concerned with these issues.19 
17. The better known $100 billion figure pledged by donors. 
18. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Cli-
mate Policy Initiative 2015.
19. Savedoff (2012) provides examples of mixed coalitions that have 
actively been influencing international cooperation in health, finance, 
and the environment. Another notable example is the Indonesia Busi-
ness Council for Sustainable Development, which offers a platform for 
In fact, the World Bank has for decades been tapped by 
bilateral donors and global philanthropies as a vehicle for pro-
viding and financing GPG programs relevant to development: 
supporting agricultural research (the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)); financing 
renewable energy programs (the Clean Technology Fund, 
one of the Climate Investment Funds); housing cross-country 
price surveys that allow comparisons of United States dollar 
purchasing power (the International Comparison Project); 
addressing coordination and pricing problems in the creation 
of new and missing global markets (the Bio-Carbon Fund); 
supporting, developing, and curating consistent, globally 
benchmarked data on such key development issues as changing 
demographic patterns, children’s tests of learning, and gender 
disaggregated data on financial inclusion such as the Global 
Findex;20 and providing the legal and fiduciary infrastructure 
for managing special funds to be deployed at the global level 
(for example, the Spanish Trust Fund for Evaluation and the 
Advanced Market Commitment Facility). 
Through its focus and support for others, the World Bank 
has also contributed to designing, collecting, and collating 
basic development data on poverty, growth, inequality, finan-
cial inclusion, environmental resources, evaluation of develop-
ment interventions, living standards, and so on.
But in the absence of a clear mandate from shareholders, 
these kinds of programs—with the partial exception of data 
and related research supported in-house through the adminis-
trative budget—have been funded only in minuscule amounts 
over the last decade by or at the World Bank—either through 
the core budget of the World Bank via various grant-making 
facilities or through donor-funded trust funds managed at 
the bank. 
The grant-making facilities peaked at $161 million in fiscal 
year 2013 and are now being phased out completely.21 Our 
businesses “to share and promote best practice in tackling risks and taking 
advantage of opportunities related to sustainable development.”
20. See for example, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2015) 
and the Task Force on Regulatory Standards for Financial Inclusion, 
“Financial Regulations for Improving Financial Inclusion.”
21. The grant-making facilities funded the Consultative Group on Inter-
national Agricultural Research and the Global Development Network, 
7
G
lo
b
a
l p
u
b
lic g
o
o
d
s: A
 cle
a
r m
a
n
d
a
te
 w
ith
 co
re
 fi
n
a
n
cin
g
rough estimate of DR-GPG provision through donor-funded 
trust funds is about $570 million a year over the last decade. 
Combining the two sources suggests a rough total of $700 
million a year (compared with lending and other country 
operations over the last five years of about $45 billion a year).
The key constraint has been the lack of a mandate to raise 
and deploy grant resources in support of DR-GPGs, at the 
World Bank or for that matter at any of the legacy MDBs. 
At the World Bank, in the absence of a grant-making win-
dow as part of a core mandate from shareholders (akin to the 
mandate and financing when the International Development 
Association (IDA) window was created in 1960), bank man-
agement has limited its GPG agenda to lending programs 
that can be implemented in a “consensual” manner “with 
partner countries.”22 That obviously has made it difficult to 
mainstream GPG support into routine country operations. 
A 2008 report of the bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG) noted that for GPG work, the “limits of non-conces-
sional finance...are clear,” since country and global risks and 
opportunities generally do not dovetail. The report invoked 
the example of the bank sponsoring large-scale analytic work 
on deforestation in Indonesia in 1999–2006 that resulted 
in little lending, concluding that “the traction achieved by 
the bank was very limited, and deforestation continued at a 
rapid clip.”23 
The situation is similar at the regional MDBs. The financ-
ing of GPGs at the regional level, and of key regional public 
goods such as the longstanding commitment to fostering trade 
integration at the IADB and the AfDB, has generally relied 
on small ad hoc allocations, often through the administra-
tive budgets of the banks. That leaves management to make 
fundamental decisions on use of scarce funds without any 
explicit mandate on priorities from shareholders. 
At the World Bank, at least in principle, existing trust 
funds could subsidize country operations such as support for 
reducing deforestation with substantial global benefits. But 
among other programs. The phase-out was agreed in 2015; $115 million 
from net income will instead now go to IBRD capital reserves. See Appen-
dix 1, Table A1.1.
22. World Bank 2007.
23. World Bank 2008.
this approach has not worked well, presumably because silo 
arrangements in the bank reduce incentives for the necessary 
coordination. The 2008 IEG report noted that “heavy reliance 
on trust funds for financing global public goods work may 
itself increase the difficulties of mainstreaming such activity 
alongside long-standing work financed by the bank’s own 
budget.”24
Heavy reliance on trust funds has other limitations. An 
obvious one is ad hoc and uncertain revenue streams, with 
a lack of continuity. For example, the original donors to the 
Clean Technology Fund (CTF), among the largest trust funds 
at the World Bank (and the largest of the Climate Investment 
Funds), envisioned a transfer of those funds from the World 
Bank to the Green Climate Fund once the latter was up and 
running. But with the politically sensitive decision of whether 
to make the transfer in limbo, and most original CTF funds 
now committed, the impetus to develop new CTF projects 
is presumably small.25 Other problems with trust funds are 
fragmentation of effort, a lack of clear lines of accountability 
in allocations of management and staff time, and limits on 
accountability of top management across and among these 
and other non-GPG trust fund programs to the shareholders 
as a group, on substantive priorities given the broader mission 
of the bank. 
Perhaps most important, there has been no mechanism for 
the global development community to generate the moral sua-
sion and the financial resources in support of collective goods 
critical to development. 
Our recommendations
1A. A new mandate and financing commitment for the 
World Bank, aimed at promoting development-relevant 
global public goods. As the premier global MDB (in opera-
tions and shareholdings), the World Bank has a comparative 
advantage in addressing challenges to shared and sustainable 
growth that transcend country borders. The world needs the 
24. World Bank 2008.
25. The reluctance to shift any new funding to the Green Climate Fund 
is related to concerns about its governance; see Birdsall (2012).
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premier global development institution to take leadership in 
building and financing products and programs that matter 
immensely for development, but on which no single country 
or set of countries has sufficient incentive to act (Appendix 
1). To exploit that comparative advantage requires that the 
shareholders agree on the financing and provision of selected 
DR-GPGs as the bank’s major priority. Shareholders should 
commit to working toward a flow of grant resources in sup-
port of this new mandate on the order of $10 billion a year 
by 2020—a figure that would double our rough estimate of 
recent annual spending across all bilaterals and multilater-
als, including the UN agencies, in the key areas set out below 
where the MDBs should be active. 
Raising and deploying these funds would be managed from 
a new financing window or fund with a separate governance 
structure. A considerable portion of the funds could be allo-
cated to other existing international agencies and organiza-
tions, and some portion could be allocated to other MDBs 
for subsidies to specific country operations with substantial 
global benefits 
This new mandate would go beyond ensuring that standard 
country operations entail global benefits. There is a sense that 
any and all country operations—by reducing poverty and 
fostering shared growth—are meant to make the world safer 
and more stable. The panel recommends for the foreseeable 
future a laser-like focus in four substantive areas where global 
spillovers—risks and opportunities—are substantial and can 
affect countries’ development prospects: energy/climate miti-
gation, health, agriculture, and data for development. 
Most MDB support to developing countries’ energy, health, 
and agricultural sectors has largely if not entirely domestic 
or national benefits, so the traditional country loan is the 
right instrument; the same is true for education, public sector 
reform, and other sectors not named above. Examples with 
spillovers (good and bad) beyond country borders include sup-
port for a robust infrastructure of agricultural research and 
development at the international level and within develop-
ing countries (given that research results are not excludable); 
for financing the incremental costs of cleaner power produc-
tion associated with the current underpricing of carbon; for 
countries succeeding in reducing deforestation; for country 
programs of upgraded disease surveillance and pandemic 
prevention and management; and for collecting and curating 
basic data relevant to development, including within develop-
ing countries.26 
Nor should the scope for DR-GPG work be defined too 
strictly by the four categories here. There is room for innovative 
financing of products and programs with spillovers that cannot 
be addressed through country lending and other operations, 
such as underwriting markets for catastrophe bonds and, as 
in a recent example proposed by the World Bank, insurance 
to cover the costs of pandemics. 
Defining the boundaries of this mandate would come on 
the financing side and would ultimately be set by the share-
holders. However, we envision two financing streams from a 
new DR-GPG window. One is direct support to third parties, 
including the regional development banks and other interna-
tional institutions as well as public–private coalitions. The 
other is subsidies to World Bank and other MDB loans to 
offset the additional costs countries otherwise assume of gen-
erating both domestic and global benefits as a result of their 
investments and programs. The most urgent case is clean power 
that is not least-cost for countries, given the current global 
underpricing of carbon.27
Mainstream country operations of all kinds at the World 
Bank would continue, but regional banks would take an 
increasing lead in operations in support of public goods at the 
country and regional level (strengthening delivery of domes-
tic health and education systems, financing roads, ports, and 
regional power grids). An increase in relative terms of more 
traditional project lending by the regional MDBs, compared 
26. One can imagine developing new products to tackle mass migration 
and refugee problems as well, as noted above. Over time, there may be 
other exceptions for consideration by the shareholders in the context of 
the governance of the GPG window. Those defined are meant not to be 
a straitjacket but to impose sufficient discipline to avoid the tendency to 
conflate what is “global” with what is a global public good.
27. The MENA Concentrated Solar Power Program of the Clean Tech-
nology Trust Fund deployed $750 million of highly concessional funds 
to leverage $4.8 billion of private financing and donor contributions. 
Together, these funds installed 1 GW of pure solar energy in the MENA 
region, reducing emissions and creating new jobs and opportunities in 
local industries.
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with the World Bank, would further an ongoing trend.28 
Any recapitalizations in the MDB system to support stan-
dard country operations would be confined to the regional 
institutions. 
A new DR-GPG mandate would require a governance 
model different from those associated with the IBRD and 
IDA. Unlike the operations of the IBRD and the hard win-
dows of the regional development banks, DR-GPG opera-
tions are more philanthropic than bank-like. As a result, the 
creditor-dominant IBRD model is less relevant and counter 
to ensuring active participation from the bank’s traditional 
borrower countries. Historically, many borrowing countries 
have resisted allocating resources to GPG activities, particu-
larly those related to climate change. They have feared that 
such activities would divert funds from projects and activities 
that they have prioritized in their development strategies in 
favor of activities that favor Western country priorities. The 
IDA model (and similarly, the soft windows at the legacy 
RDBs) giving IDA donors a predominant decision making 
role is also problematic from this perspective. IDA-eligible 
countries have long feared that donor contributions to sup-
port GPG activities would not be fully additional to ongoing 
contributions to the IDA window. 
A separate governance arrangement for the GPG window 
also avoids the conflict of interest for the main World Bank 
Group boards that come with decisions on how to allocate 
funds to programs that could be more effectively deployed 
by other institutions, and that ought to reflect decisions of 
shareholders regarding priorities among sectors (such as cli-
mate and health) and the performance and capabilities of 
other institutions. 
Financing for the DR-GPG agenda would be less dependent 
on traditional donors than IDA has been. Because it would 
draw on World Bank income (including IBRD income and 
some capitalization of IDA reflows), the bank’s borrowers 
would have some claim on decisions about the use of those 
funds for DR-GPG purposes. In this way, a more collective 
28. A round of global crisis-related recapitalizations in 2009–2010 caused 
a shift away from the World Bank in favor of the regional MDBs: prior 
to 2010, the World Bank accounted for half of all MDB capital, and after 
the recapitalizations, it fell to 39 percent.
governance structure could better ensure political support 
for the agenda across the diverse array of World Bank mem-
ber countries. In particular, traditional borrowing countries 
would be ensured a decisive role in identifying priority GPG 
activities.29 
Some form of representation that takes into account coun-
try economic and population sizes could ensure the kind of 
balanced representation (with 50 percent creditors and 50 
percent borrowers). This is in some respects reflected in the 
governance of the Climate Investment Funds at the World 
Bank—the GPG-oriented trust funds that have successfully 
overcome the divisions associated with donor-directed public 
goods activities—and the IADB since the mid-1990s. 
In short, leading emerging market countries like Brazil, 
China, and India have a strong interest in meeting global chal-
lenges, but they will want a strong say in how the World Bank 
deploys grant resources toward these objectives. The same can 
be said of Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and other IDA countries. From 
this perspective, there would be considerable strategic value 
in locating the new DR-GPG structure in a major emerging 
market city, such as Shanghai. 
The new GPG mandate will require dedicated financing—
much of it grant based—additional to current limited and 
fragile administrative budget allocations and highly dispersed 
and unpredictable trust fund support (which we estimate 
has amounted to less than $400 million a year in the last five 
years). We believe $10 billion annually is an ambitious but 
achievable target. 
This financing agenda has so far failed to take hold at the 
World Bank in part due to the lack of a clear mandate from 
its shareholders, but also due to legitimate concerns about 
where the money would come from. The bank’s borrower 
members have feared a painful reallocation of concessional 
resources away from traditional country lending while those 
funds were still very much needed to support low-income 
countries. Among others, the British, Germans, and Nor-
wegians have made commitments to trust funds addressing 
29. This “global public goods” mandate could also be made more politically 
viable with a separate geography. Housing a new GPG arm of the bank in a 
developing country would promote wider buy-in, and guard against capture 
by the traditional project-lending orientation of the bank in Washington.
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global issues managed by the bank, especially in the climate 
area. But for the most part, the bank’s non-borrowing mem-
bers have resisted expanding their role as donors to support a 
larger and more strategic DR-GPG mandate on top of existing 
funding commitments.
However, we see an opportunity for the bank’s shareholders 
to work together to define a clear mandate on underfunded 
global challenges and to take practical steps to provide the 
bulk of funding to operationalize that mandate through more 
flexible uses of existing resources. By rethinking its business 
model, the bank could continue to meet pressing concessional 
financing needs in low-income countries while also making 
major new commitments to the GPG agenda—all at current 
levels of donor support.30 
1B. A new business model for the World Bank, lever-
aging future reflows. Finding additional resources for DR-
GPGs in an era of tight donor budgets will require a new 
approach to key aspects of the World Bank’s business model.31 
The starting point is to recognize that IDA’s outstanding loans, 
totaling about $146 billion, will generate highly predictable 
reflows for the World Bank in the coming years, and com-
bined with liquidity and other assets, can be recognized as 
IDA’s total equity of $175 billion.32 This equity—alongside 
the bank’s core capital of around $40 billion—could be bor-
rowed against, leveraging significantly more funds to support 
30. Similarly, shareholders of the RDBs could explore a clear man-
date around regional public goods supported by appropriate financing 
mechanisms.
31. In addition to the measures we recommend here, we also see scope 
for further exploration of measures that could better leverage the bank’s 
balance sheet. S&P suggests that, in aggregate, MDBs could increase their 
lending exposures by 72 percent within their current ratings. One approach 
would be to increase the leverage ratio from 1 to 1.5, but increasing by only 
0.1 every five years, to calibrate the increase with market responses. Beyond 
greater leveraging, greater borrowing by large emerging market countries 
could enable a decrease in currency risk for borrowers and help develop 
local bond markets, with IBRD bonds helping to develop yield curves.
32. Under business as usual, current credit reflows provide about $4.5 
billion to IDA each year and are expected to rise to $5.5 billion a year 
over the next five years. This represents half the level of current IDA donor 
contributions.
operations in current IDA and IBRD countries, while freeing 
up considerable traditional donor grant money to support 
the bank’s new GPG mandate. Some donor funds, as well as 
some of the loan repayments, would continue to be needed to 
provide the subsidy element that achieves the concessionality 
in IDA lending.
The merger of the concessional and market-based lending 
windows at the AsDB in 2015 illustrates the possibilities gener-
ated by some leveraging of the substantial equity represented 
in the stock of outstanding concessional loans. This financial 
engineering enabled a 50 percent increase in lending capac-
ity while maintaining concessional lending capacity, cutting 
donor grant contributions by nearly half, and requesting no 
new capital contributions from shareholders.33 
Discussions already under way at the World Bank this 
year (see Appendix 2) indicate that even modest steps toward 
borrowing against IDA equity introduce several new possibili-
ties while maintaining current levels of concessional lending. 
New possibilities include increases in overall lending to all 
borrowers (potentially yielding increases in net income from 
operations in middle-income countries),34 significant cuts in 
the level of grant money requested of IDA donors, or redeploy-
ment of that grant money in support of a new GPG mandate. 
The critical policy challenge is to choose the best option or 
combination of options made possible by the financial reforms.
We see a risk of too much incrementalism reflected in the 
current discussion of IDA equity at the World Bank—with 
too much emphasis on generating higher lending volumes 
without clear purposes—and a continuing harmful reliance 
on ad hoc arrangements and initiatives to deal with unpre-
dictable calls on concessional finance. For example, the new 
MENA Financing Initiative relies on one-off donor grant 
contributions to buy down the terms on IBRD loans, primar-
ily to Jordan and Lebanon for support to refugee programs in 
33. Birdsall, Morris, and Rueda-Sabater 2014; Bhushan and Borghijs 2015.
34. We expect it will also be possible, as institutions in most middle-
income countries continue to mature, to make larger loans with reduced 
World Bank staff inputs to those countries. The new safeguard policy issued 
in August of this year relies implicitly on countries’ increasing capability 
in honoring safeguard principles.
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those countries.35 The case for concessional lending in these 
settings may be strong, and buying down the terms on IBRD 
loans through a grant element may be a reasonable approach. 
But reliance on trust funds for specific countries and regions 
contributes to the risk that the bank’s core financial model will 
not be adjusted in ways that meet GPG and other financing 
needs in the years ahead.
But perhaps the greatest risk of leveraging IDA by combin-
ing the IDA and IBRD balance sheets36 would be reductions 
in grant support from donors when there is a compelling case 
for the use of those grant funds under a new GPG mandate. 
As more countries graduate from IDA assistance,37 donors 
will quickly come to see diminished need for their grant con-
tributions to support IDA lending, particularly if the World 
Bank adopts a model that maximizes the potential leverage of 
IDA reflows by combining the IBRD and IDA balance sheets. 
Unless the opportunity is taken now to direct this donor sav-
ings toward the $10 billion global public goods target, donors 
will reallocate these funds for other purposes—whether as 
new trust funds at the bank, as contributions to other institu-
tions, or as savings to their taxpayers. These all are reasonable 
outcomes but have less potential impact than a robust GPG 
agenda for the bank.
Alternatively, recognizing the leveraging of current IDA 
resources that we recommend, we see ample scope over the 
next decade to redirect donor contributions from IDA (from 
concessional aid directed to low-income countries) to the DR-
GPG window (from which low-income countries are likely to 
benefit disproportionately in any case). Traditional donors 
could account for $5 billion in annual contributions toward 
GPGs without a net increase in their assistance budgets by 
reallocating some of their traditional IDA contributions, 
which would no longer be needed to maintain current levels 
of concessional support for IDA countries (Figure 2). With 
35. See MENA Financing Initiative at www.menafinancing.org.
36. As of the time of writing, we understand that a full merger is not under 
discussion, because IDA and IBRD currently are separate legal entities. 
We do not think that should be a permanent barrier to doing what makes 
most sense given the changing challenges that the MDB system faces.
37. See Appendix 2. As many as one-third to one-half of the current IDA-
eligible countries could graduate from IDA assistance over the next decade.
country graduations from IDA, as well as the small subsidy 
needed to support concessional lending terms in the current 
interest rate environment, this reallocation would not dimin-
ish concessional financing for remaining IDA-eligible coun-
tries. (Indeed, our Recommendation 3 is based on the likeli-
hood that resources for remaining countries could increase.) In 
addition, we recommend that transfers of IBRD and Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC) income that have been used 
to support IDA, now about $700 million a year, be redirected 
to the DR-GPG window. 
Over time, shareholders of the World Bank might want to 
agree to provide the DR-GPG window with capital, creating 
an endowment-like source of income. And the board of the 
DR-GPG window might itself agree on crediting contribu-
tions to such an endowment in a manner that recognizes dif-
ferences in ability to contribute while retaining the balanced 
governance structure. 
The DR-GPG window, with a new governance model that 
gives greater voice to developing countries, would also ask 
more of them. In addition to participating in a future capi-
talization of the window, we see scope for major emerging 
market countries to become major contributors to the win-
dow, potentially reaching $4 billion annually by 2025. As 
with China’s participation in certain MDB trust funds, some 
portion of contributions (we suggest $500 million) might be 
considered as equity or loans to the window, earning a return 
for the contributors. 
Ambition toward a full IDA-IBRD merger at the World 
Bank is limited less by the financial and policy case than by the 
political hurdles of combining distinct legal and governance 
models. At the AsDB, this issue was sidestepped by preserv-
ing the separate governance structures even as financing was 
merged. At the World Bank, we believe the adjustments to 
current shareholding and other governance arrangements 
with a complete merger would be politically manageable. For 
example, under a scenario where IDA and IBRD equity were 
treated equally on a dollar-for-dollar basis, overall adjustments 
in the size of relative shareholding would be modest, with the 
United States and China together making small concessions in 
shareholding with gains distributed broadly across the other 
member countries (see Appendix 2 for details). 
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DR-GPG
window
$10 billion/year 
Re-allocation of traditional
IDA donations 
Capital contributions
World Bank income
Emerging market donor
contributions 
Leveraged IDA
reﬂows 
Financing $10 billion a year
Deploying $10 billion a year
as…
Subsidies for selected country loansGrants
to…
World Bank &
other MDBS 
World Bank, 
international 
agencies, 
and research 
organizations 
Reducing tropical deforestation
Renewable energy
Agricultural and health research
Disease surveillance 
Consortium of International 
Agricultural Research Centers
International Comparison Program
Global Environment Facility/Green 
Climate Fund
World Health Organization
African Economic Research 
Consortium
Figure 2: A new DR-GPG window: Financing and deploying $10 billion a year 
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Although we see a strong case for a separate governance 
structure to support DR-GPG financing, we believe that 
the silo governance structures between IDA and IBRD are 
reaching the end of their utility. The strength of the case for 
a single balance sheet to support country financing activities 
also points to the weakness of maintaining separate systems 
to govern essentially the same sets of activities. 
A new GPG mandate supported by a new business model 
will also require some transition in staffing and expertise at the 
World Bank. As with other aspects of corporate governance, 
we choose not to offer detailed guidance here, but note that 
the bank’s shareholders should give priority to the question 
of staff composition in their strategic oversight. In the near 
term, for example, as the World Bank increases its role in sup-
port of global data, research, and evaluation programs and 
creates new financial products to bring private investment 
to climate-friendly infrastructure, there will be greater need 
for staff expertise in these areas. In turn, with less emphasis 
on project lending, there can be less need for staffing compli-
ance functions. 
At the same time, there will need to be stronger disciplines 
on budgetary costs associated with such a large bureaucracy, 
and we are cognizant of the risks that a new GPG mandate 
could lead to further bureaucratic expansion without compen-
sating reductions elsewhere in the organization. This would 
not be a good outcome and would further diminish the bank’s 
ability to generate net income to support the GPG agenda. 
We also believe that World Bank shareholders should 
embrace an approach to loan pricing that continues to dem-
onstrate sensitivity to borrowers’ ability to pay while placing 
greater priority on income generation in support of global 
public goods. As we call for later in this report, a differentiated 
approach to loan pricing—with highly creditworthy borrowers 
asked to pay more than current IBRD lending terms—could 
contribute significantly to the GPG agenda, particularly when 
bank income is constrained by the low interest rate environ-
ment. A political bargain could be struck that also allows for 
more price flexibility (more concessional terms) on a limited 
basis for these same borrowers in support of GPGs or highly 
targeted programs to reduce poverty and inequality in middle-
income countries.
Finally, the financial reforms we call for here are particu-
larly compelling in today’s interest rate environment, with low 
rates enabling the AAA-rated MDBs to borrow very cheaply 
and in turn lend to their clients on highly favorable terms. 
In particular, this environment has significantly reduced 
the spread between the World Bank’s concessional lending 
terms and IBRD terms. Our proposals seek to make better 
use of bank resources in light of these circumstances. But we 
acknowledge the potential risks and need for adjustments over 
time as the external environment changes. 
If the World Bank’s cost of borrowing increased signifi-
cantly in the years ahead, this would put new stresses on its 
combined IBRD-IDA balance sheet and could once again put 
the onus on the bank’s donors to support concessional financ-
ing. But in recognizing that risk, we nonetheless see a greater 
immediate risk that the bank does not do enough to use its 
resources efficiently and maximize its financing potential in 
the face of compelling needs.
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The challenge 
The growth agenda has been critical for legacy MDBs histori-
cally, but it has come in and out of fashion over the years. In 
the first decade of this century, a growing focus on reducing 
absolute poverty and improving people’s well-being brought 
reasonable new emphasis on education, health, social insur-
ance, and environment programs led by the World Bank. 
Meanwhile, growing concerns about waste, corruption, and 
compliance in large infrastructure—particularly but not only 
in hydroelectric power and urban transport—reduced the 
share of infrastructure lending. 
More recently, with the increases in overall growth fueled 
by China’s (now declining) demand across the developing 
world today, infrastructure bottlenecks have become a more 
visible and critical constraint on sustaining that growth. And 
with the growing risk of a global growth slowdown, investing 
in infrastructure in the developing world has become a criti-
cal spur to global demand, to the healthy continuation of the 
benefits of cooperation on global challenges associated with 
the convergence of income among rich and poor countries, 
and to the potential to quickly ramp up long-run investment 
in climate-friendly sustained growth. 
When Morocco switched on the world’s largest concen-
trated solar power plant at Ourzazate earlier this year, it 
showed what is possible when public investment in sustain-
able power works in partnership with the MDBs. A mix of 
market-based and concessional financing from the World 
Bank, AfDB, and EIB enabled Morocco to move forward with 
a massive investment in solar, which will ultimately provide 
power to more than 1 million consumers in Morocco and 
reduce carbon emissions by 760,000 tons a year. 
MDB partnerships can also catalyze private investment 
in climate-friendly infrastructure. For example, concessional 
financing through the AsDB has unlocked commercial lend-
ing for geothermal projects in Indonesia, including the 320 
megawatt Sarulla geothermal power project.
The panel believes that through landmark partnerships 
like Ourzazate and Sarulla, the MDBs are demonstrating 
that they are best equipped to address a triple challenge in 
infrastructure: 
• More, especially in Africa where energy poverty is deep and 
where transport infrastructure is vital to bind economies 
together.
• Cleaner, including in coal-rich East and South Asia, to 
protect health and the environment locally and globally. 
• More privately financed, with limited public finance crowd-
ing in private investors—because in sectors like power, 
public finance often in the past has filled a vacuum due not 
to a lack of private capital but to a lack of the regulatory 
and pricing environment that private capital demands. 
Success in these three areas relies heavily on the strengths 
of the MDBs as multilateral and collective institutions in 
a world where international cooperation is critical not only 
to development but to peace and security. The ability of the 
MDBs, new as well as legacy, to play these roles requires that 
their shareholders, especially their major shareholders, take 
the lead in pushing them in new directions.
Critically, MDB success in this area is just as relevant to 
middle-income and emerging market countries as it is for low-
income countries. Cleaner infrastructure will have the largest 
climate impact in these larger markets. And because these 
creditworthy countries have access to much greater volumes 
of financing outside of the MDBs, the market failures associ-
ated with public infrastructure and clean technologies are as 
binding on these countries as they are on any other. 
Increased investment in 
sustainable infrastructure
Chapter 2
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Our recommendations 
2A. Greater overall support for sustainable infrastructure 
finance. In response to today’s compelling development and 
climate imperatives, shareholders should support a substan-
tial increase in financing sustainable infrastructure by the 
MDBs over the next decade. A reasonable target is to reach 
$200 billion a year from today’s roughly $50 billion, taking 
into account any increased financial capability at the two 
new banks. 
Estimates of infrastructure financing needs can serve as 
useful targets for MDB support. One recent estimate of the 
need for sustainable infrastructure indicates an additional $3 
trillion a year for developing countries, of which an additional 
$200 billion a year could come through the MDBs.38 Current 
support for infrastructure among the legacy MDBs amounts 
to about $50 billion a year,39 forming the largest share of their 
total annual commitments of $127 billion.40 
The argument that underinvestment in infrastructure 
in developing countries is a major constraint on growth is 
not new.41 But it is equally the case that estimates of need do 
not necessarily point to productive investment, that publicly 
financed infrastructure in the developing world has too often 
failed to meet minimum standards of efficiency, and that 
governments have too often been tempted to finance invest-
ments in infrastructure that private sector investors would not 
make without public credit and guarantees, due to a lack of 
confidence in appropriate public policies ensuring an adequate 
return on their investments. 
Still, four factors persuade us to be ambitious. First, ongoing 
research suggests that the lack of adequate infrastructure, for 
which public financing is critical, severely limits growth and 
job creation, especially in low-income countries. The most 
compelling evidence is the high cost and unreliability of elec-
tricity in most of Africa, making it impossible for domestic 
industries to compete in the global market.42 Infrastructure 
38. Bhattacharya, Oppenheim, and Stern 2015.
39. Humphrey 2015.
40. Wilson 2015.
41. See World Bank (1994). For a recent survey, see Sawada (2015).
42. Ramachandran, Gelb, and Shah 2009.
bottlenecks are seen as limiting job creation and exacerbating 
inequalities associated with rural residence and long peri-
urban commutes that hit low-income populations. These help 
explain the recent upsurge in demand from borrowers for 
infrastructure support (seen in part in the creation of the 
two new banks, including statements of officials from India 
and China).43
Second, there is strong evidence of the growth and develop-
ment impact of public investment in infrastructure, despite 
the poor record overall in high measured returns because of 
low efficiency.44,45 
Third, the MDBs are in a position to improve the efficiency 
and overall quality of investments. Various surveys consistently 
rank these institutions highly on measures of quality and effi-
ciency and more generally as preferred partners by developing 
country actors.46,47,48 In our view, this preference reflects the 
ability of the MDBs to be catalytic, both in leveraging other 
sources of financing (particularly private financing) and in the 
unique policy engagement that the banks bring to support the 
overall quality and impact of their project lending. 
Fourth, and critically, we are compelled by assessments that 
see major climate gains to be realized through a major infra-
structure push, particularly now as the incremental costs of 
renewable technologies are falling and climate-friendly infra-
structure increasingly becomes the norm. Beyond green tech-
nologies, simply achieving greater energy efficiency through 
adopting newer infrastructure can achieve large reductions in 
emissions. In India, an estimated 80 percent reduction in emis-
sions could be realized through the switch to more efficient 
43. The G24 group of major MDB borrowing countries have consistently 
called for higher levels of MDB lending in response to country demand 
in recent years, most recently in their October 2015 communique. This 
has been echoed in recent statements by finance ministers from India 
and China.
44. Berg et al. 2015.
45. International Monetary Fund 2015.
46. Custer et al. 2015.
47. Department for International Development 2011.
48. Brookings Global Economy and Development and Center for Global 
Development 2016.
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machinery and systems, with the latter including greater rail 
and public transport investment.49 
For all of these reasons, we see a strong case for a signifi-
cant scaling up in MDB infrastructure financing. Doing so—
whether to $200 billion annually as we recommend, or even 
to $250 billion annually—would not close a gap estimated 
in the trillions. But we believe the target is meaningful when 
we consider the possible demonstration effect of innovation 
on the sustainability dimension, and the possible multiplier 
effect of MDB financing, which can enable other sources of 
public financing and attract private investment to projects 
that would otherwise be unattractive to investors.50 Similarly, 
the policy leverage that the MDBs can achieve through their 
infrastructure engagements also argues for a larger role, even 
though it would fall well short of closing the gap. By demon-
strating successes in developing countries, including working 
with country governments to address policy barriers to greater 
investment, the MDBs can have an impact on infrastructure 
investment that extends well beyond their direct financing. 
An alternative approach, one that would show a great deal 
more ambition on direct MDB financing, would introduce 
unacceptably high risks that the additional funding would be 
poorly spent or would sit idly as the MDBs struggled to find 
bankable projects. 
In fact, a more prominent infrastructure role for the MDBs 
should come with enhanced ability and incentives to bring 
the appropriate set of financial and risk management instru-
ments to the table (not only loans and guarantees, but also 
grant-based concessionality in various forms). With these 
capabilities, MDBs could take leadership in catalyzing and 
supporting the scale of investment necessary to deliver least-
cost next generation low-carbon infrastructure investment in 
the developing world.
In support of these aims, we believe MDB shareholders 
should consider the value proposition of additional capital 
as well as better leveraging of existing MDB capital through 
49. Ahluwalia, Gupta, and Stern 2016.
50. A recent report prepared by the major MDBs for the SDG Summit, 
“From Billions to Trillions: MDB Contributions to Financing for Devel-
opment,” points to the leveraging effect of MDB finance, particularly for 
infrastructure.
further balance sheet optimization as outlined by the G20.51 
Such measures, including those endorsed elsewhere in this 
report (leveraging concessional funds and using guarantee 
instruments more) could also include exposure exchanges52 
and greater differentiation in loan pricing.53 
Differentiation in loan pricing, as first proposed in the 
Volcker-Gurria commission on the MDBs, could be income-
based rather than risk-based, such that the MDBs’ wealthier 
borrowers would pay harder terms than less wealthy borrow-
ers.54 In this way, they would be giving back more to the insti-
tutions as they progress economically. Differential pricing in 
this form would also discourage borrowing from the MDBs 
simply to exploit softer terms than countries could obtain from 
other sources, and ultimately could encourage an informal 
self-graduation when countries no longer see any non-price 
benefits from their MDB borrowing.
Calls for additional capital contributions from sharehold-
ers should also receive serious consideration. We recognize 
that the question of additional capital from shareholders is 
ultimately political. If some countries are unwilling to pro-
vide more capital in the face of a broader consensus among 
the institution’s shareholders, they should be willing to see 
their shareholding diluted. In the next section, we address 
the question of new capital among the various MDBs and 
the case for a new emphasis on the regional banks’ overall 
financing capacity.
2B. Greater differentiation between the World Bank 
and the regional MDBs. The joint MDB response on infra-
structure should be anchored by the rebranding of the IBRD 
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Sustainable 
Development (IBRSD). A core part of the World Bank’s new 
DR-GPG mandate should emphasize leveraging investment 
51. G20 2015.
52. The MDBs have undertaken “synthetic swaps” to better allocate the 
country risks in their portfolios. Under these arrangements, the concentra-
tion risks facing each MDB can be better diversified through exchanges 
with each other.
53. Other innovative public financing proposals extend beyond the scope 
of this MDB report but merit consideration. For example, see Sheng and 
Geng (2016).
54. Volcker and Gurría 2001.
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in sustainable infrastructure, with World Bank infrastructure 
lending devoted exclusively to developing and financing green 
infrastructure. The renaming points to the need to prioritize 
sustainability in the bank’s activities, as well as the need for 
greater ambition around sustainable infrastructure invest-
ment overall. 
As the IBRSD, the World Bank should take the lead in 
supporting countries’ resilience to climate change (seawalls, 
new agricultural applications, natural disaster insurance) and 
investing in areas of infrastructure (cleaner energy, public 
transport) that clearly demonstrate both national benefits 
and global benefits consistent with the bank’s new global 
public goods mandate called for in our first recommendation. 
A premium should be placed on leveraging private and other 
sources of financing outside the bank through guarantees, 
currency hedges, and other financing products that do not 
rely on direct World Bank lending. In general, the emphasis 
should be less on lending volume and more on new products 
and new uses of bank capital.
We believe the IBRSD should anchor a scaled-up approach 
focusing on infrastructure that is climate-resilient and emis-
sion-reducing across the entire MDB system. And regional 
banks should assume the leading role in overall financing 
of infrastructure, particularly of basic public infrastructure 
across the board, including critical cross-border and regional 
infrastructure. 
With a clearer delineation of responsibilities, the World 
Bank should shift management and staff resources away from 
bigger, more conventional lending operations toward develop-
ing initiatives that respond to growing demand in the devel-
oping world for climate resilience and growing support for 
climate mitigation and other environmental protections.
Although we do not envision a cessation of non-conces-
sional project lending at the World Bank, we do expect that, 
as the bank takes on a robust global public goods mandate, 
traditional infrastructure lending activities would be more 
prominent in relative terms at the regional banks. This would 
take advantage of the increasing sense of ownership of their 
borrowing countries, reflected in borrower support for their 
recent recapitalizations and the initiatives of China and other 
emerging market economies in founding the two new MDBs. 
As a general matter, any increases in capital to allow a scal-
ing up of infrastructure should be calibrated by shareholders 
based on each MDB’s performance in financing productive, 
efficient, and green investments. 
The total capacity of the regional MDBs already surpasses 
the World Bank’s, due in part to larger recapitalizations fol-
lowing the 2009–10 global financial crisis—and this is before 
considering the prospective financing capacity of the AIIB and 
NDB. We believe this ongoing shift in capacity points the way 
toward an appropriate realignment going forward. A newly-
branded IBRSD can provide leadership on sustainability issues 
for the system as a whole, while the regional institutions are 
the more sensible outlets to take on more of the financing of 
infrastructure overall. 
Regional MDBs have in principle a greater political pres-
ence associated with their regional ownership and, in most 
cases, their leadership at various levels. As a result, they have a 
stronger claim and record of success in support of cross-border 
infrastructure. The IADB has long promoted and supported 
other regional institutions, including the two major subre-
gional development banks—the Andean Development Cor-
poration and the Central American Bank—and the African 
Development Bank has successfully emphasized regional infra-
structure in the last decade. Shareholders should recognize 
that the regional MDBs are much better placed today to meet 
infrastructure financing needs than they were 20 years ago. 
2C. Crowding in private finance. Private sector develop-
ment has rightly become a central pillar of the global devel-
opment agenda and aspirations for a major sustainable infra-
structure push at the MDBs will depend on the ability of these 
institutions to better crowd in the private sector. But the MDB 
approach to private sector engagement has not done enough to 
demonstrate that they are truly catalytic, rather than substi-
tutes, when it comes to private investment (see Appendix 3). 
That is, that they are effectively crowding in and not crowding 
out private finance. Direct lending to governments and firms 
continues to dominate MDB portfolios (Figure 3), even with 
a growing recognition that the MDB insurance function is 
better matched to supporting the development of private mar-
kets and the flow of private funds to developing countries.55
55. Humphrey and Prizzon 2014.
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We call on MDB shareholders to set clear targets for the 
use of guarantee instruments, as a concrete way to shift the 
MDBs toward a catalytic role for private sector investment. 
We believe a target of 20 percent of portfolios for nontrade 
finance guarantees is appropriate. Only at the World Bank 
do guarantees account for a nontrivial share of operations, 
and even here, much of this activity is trade finance. With 
broad targets, MDB management will be better motivated 
to address the barriers and disincentives to broader use of 
guarantee instruments, such as pricing and accounting treat-
ment (Appendix 3). 
The MDBs should also increase their private sector activities 
in riskier markets and sectors, where lack of private financing 
is an obvious development problem. Because of the tradeoffs 
with risk and profitability, shareholders should consider tar-
gets or even temporary binding earmarks for riskier countries 
and sectors, accepting that this probably will reduce expected 
returns and increase unit costs. 
The MDBs should pursue a more integrated approach to 
private sector activities, starting with the World Bank. As 
with an IBRD-IDA merger, we believe a merger of IFC and 
MIGA balance sheets could achieve greater efficiencies in 
pursuit of a broader suite of instruments (loans, equity, and 
guarantees). Given the case for more catalytic financing instru-
ments, it is particularly striking how little financing capac-
ity is represented in MIGA as a standalone entity, given the 
potential for guarantee instruments to crowd in private flows 
for development purposes.
Finally, we believe that some of the greatest gains in private 
sector development will come through more robust MDB 
engagement with governments to improve regulatory regimes 
and other aspects of the broader investment climate. MDB 
lending and guarantees can play an important role in address-
ing market failures associated with inadequate information 
about developing markets (which leads to an overpricing of 
risk). But it is too often the case that the underlying risk is 
in fact too high for private investors, due to problems that 
developing country governments can address through policy 
reform and capacity building. These problems are particularly 
acute in infrastructure investment, such as in the energy sector, 
where private investors could play a much larger role but for 
weak legal and regulatory regimes. MDBs should prioritize 
their engagement with sovereign clients in these areas.
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Figure 3: MDB investments by instrument
Source: Annual reports 2014.
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The challenge
We see the continuing need for traditional concessional finance 
for low-income, often fragile, states—some conflict-ridden, 
some post-conflict—for the next 15 years at least. The focus 
should be on building institutions of the state and encourag-
ing reforms that support business investment. Though the 
number of countries eligible for concessional finance under 
traditional MDB rules will likely decline significantly over 
the next decade,56 many of those that remain can be defined 
as fragile and conflict-affected, and far less likely to be able 
to borrow on anything other than highly concessional terms 
(see Appendix 2, Table A2.2 projections). 
Most but not all remaining low-income countries eligible 
for concessional finance are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently 
the World Bank’s concessional fund, IDA, devotes 50 per-
cent of its annual financing to Africa (or roughly $8 billion), 
making it the largest source of concessional resources to the 
region.57 The African Development Bank’s concessional fund-
ing is about $2.25 billion a year.58
As a group, low-income countries that still need access to 
concessional finance can be presumed to face particularly 
tough constraints to growth inherent in their endowments, 
their politics, their history, or their neighborhoods. Sustain-
ing the kind of patient, long-run support for these countries is 
not easy politically, given the likelihood of repeated setbacks 
over several decades. 
It can be argued that the role of the MDBs (along with the 
IMF) in supporting macroeconomic management and reforms 
in those countries has been constructive. Many low-income 
56. For example, various estimates suggest that the number of IDA-eligible 
countries could be halved by 2025 under the existing rules (see Appendix 2).
57. See World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/africa/.
58. See AfDB Annual Report, 2014.
countries in Africa have enjoyed healthy growth rates, par-
ticularly since the early 2000s, following programs that sub-
stantially reduced their public debts. It is also the case that 
concessional finance and other aid have played a critical role 
in saving and improving lives by financing access to vaccines 
and other critical medicines and supporting the build-up of 
health and education systems. However, it is also difficult, 
beyond debt relief, to associate MDB (and bilateral) financ-
ing with recent growth of some low-income countries—as 
opposed to a benign external environment and good domestic 
leadership in those countries. The bottom line: it is too soon 
to consider a diminution in the MDBs’ financing role (and in 
other forms of external financial support) for many of these 
countries, but it also is unacceptable to view the MDB role 
in terms of business as usual. 
The MDBs have too often struggled to demonstrate suc-
cesses in the poorest countries, often defined by conflict situa-
tions and other sources of fragility. In part, they are bound by 
overly-rigid financing rules and silos that favor performance 
at the country level over responsiveness to immediate needs 
and opportunities—whether the risk posed by a fast-moving 
pandemic or the opportunity represented in a newly-elected 
democratic government in a country that has struggled with 
civil conflict. MDB successes in the poorest countries have 
also been limited due to the staff incentives that favor work 
in large borrower countries—such as the emerging markets—
over work in small and poor countries.
Our recommendations
Our recommendations come in three parts. First is a clear com-
mitment to effective and sustained engagement in low-income 
countries. Second is a gradual shift of concessional resources 
from the World Bank to the African Development Bank. 
Beyond business as usual on 
concessional financing
Chapter 3
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And third is the imperative to end the hard line in the legacy 
MDBs that confines most concessional financing to a rigid 
income-based definition of the need for concessional terms. 
3A. Clear commitment to a baseline of concessional 
MDB support for low-income countries with a clearer 
focus on effective outcomes. Although the current low 
interest rate environment has blurred the distinction between 
concessional and market-based MDB lending, concessional 
financing (including grant-only assistance) across the MDBs 
continues to be critical for non-creditworthy low-income 
countries. The sustained progress by many in recent years—
measured in stable growth, fiscal improvements, and access 
to private capital—can quickly reverse, as evidenced in the 
current environment of uncertainty, with IMF vulnerability 
measures ticking upward for all low-income countries.59 
Shareholders should commit to supporting a baseline of 
concessional financing over the next decade, based on cur-
rent levels of concessional lending of approximately $25 bil-
lion across the legacy MDBs,60 even as a number of countries 
graduate from this assistance under the existing rules. A firm 
baseline commitment will better position MDBs to respond 
to different country circumstances—whether scaling up in 
turnaround situations in countries emerging from conflict, 
managing increased demand from countries buffeted by a 
more difficult interest rate environment globally, responding 
to humanitarian crises, or exploring targeted support at the 
subnational level in countries that are not low income. 
A commitment to concessionality can be delivered 
through various means and does not require rigid adherence 
to longstanding fundraising and business models. As with 
our call for a new World Bank business model, all MDBs 
should explore more innovative ways to raise concessional 
funds, moving beyond the longstanding donor replenish-
ments of ring-fenced concessional windows. For example, 
use of concessional funds to buy down the terms of lending 
to low-income countries from the market-lending windows 
59. International Monetary Fund 2014.
60. This figure approximates aggregate annual concessional financing 
levels across legacy MDBs that have concessional financing arms (World 
Bank, AfDB, AsDB, and IADB).
can deliver greater volumes of concessional lending.61 Balance 
sheet consolidation is one way for more efficient use of MDB 
resources (with terms more effectively matched to need) to 
free up more of the existing concessional funds. At the World 
Bank, these approaches should more than substitute for the 
practice of transferring net income from the IBRD and IFC 
to the IDA window. In addition to adding to tensions between 
traditional IDA contributors and the major borrowers (who 
view the transfers as a decapitalization of the bank), that has 
also reduced the overall leverage of the bank’s operations.
Recognizing the possible need for significantly larger flows 
to fragile countries in the years ahead and the limits on the 
capacity of low-income countries to absorb new financing, it 
will be important that each MDB develops and demonstrates 
greater effectiveness operating in environments where coun-
try operational capacity is low. The shareholders should hold 
MDBs accountable for exploring new approaches to support—
such as rewarding countries on the basis of measured and 
verified progress on outcomes or results, rather than financing 
solely inputs, and generally doing better at allocating resources 
in line with country effectiveness in using those resources. 
3B. A shift of concessional funds to the African Devel-
opment Bank. As with infrastructure, we see the need for 
greater specialization in concessional finance for development 
among the MDBs, with the regional banks taking on more 
responsibility—including in the social sectors and agriculture, 
where their greater engagement at the political and techni-
cal level within countries is an advantage. For Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the concentration of low-income countries is 
greatest, shareholders should over the next 10–15 years sup-
port a gradual shift of concessional finance from the World 
Bank to the AfDB. Currently, IDA financing in the region 
is four times greater than that of the AfDB’s concessional 
financing arm. Yet, consistent with adequate growth in capac-
ity, we believe the regionally based institution will be bet-
ter positioned to achieve sustained development progress in 
the most challenging environments—and will better enable 
the World Bank to shift its core focus to a global agenda. 
61. This has been the practice at the IADB since 2007 with the estab-
lishment of the Debt Sustainability and Enhanced Performance-Based 
Allocation framework (DSF/EPBA).
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Greater emphasis on regional institutions will also be a means 
to address longstanding World Bank staffing disincentives for 
working in the poorest countries.
3C. Ending the silos and promoting flexibility. The 
MDBs should explore more flexible approaches to identifying 
concessional needs among countries. Near-exclusive reliance 
on gross national income (GNI) per capita as a measure of a 
country’s capacity to build the institutions to manage and sus-
tain growth and poverty reduction is not sensible (see Appen-
dix 4). A broader array of measures could include median 
income, poverty headcounts, or measures of institutional 
limits in the short run on fiscal capacity, as in post-conflict 
settings where new democratic governments are assuming 
power. Using a broader array of measures would also better 
enable the MDBs to match concessional resources to needs on 
the ground and would enable MDBs to better target resources 
to lower-middle-income countries, which currently are poorly 
served by the existing rigid approach. 
At the World Bank, this effort will be facilitated by our 
recommendation to merge IDA and the IBRSD. At all of the 
MDBs, such a change would liberate concessional finance 
from the strictures associated with it since the founding of the 
World Bank. The panel believes that given the changing nature 
of the development challenges in this century—the climate 
problem, pandemic risks, rising numbers of people affected by 
natural disasters, continuing likelihood of major movements 
of people across borders, growing awareness of the millions 
of people living in refugee camps—ex ante commitments of 
concessional funds for contingencies that are not predictable, 
and greater flexibility in their use, make sense. That brings us 
to our next recommendation.
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The challenge 
All developing countries—low income or not—are vulnerable 
to the sudden and difficult-to-manage fiscal burdens that crises 
of various sorts can impose, diverting spending and attention 
from fundamental development investments and programs. 
The legacy MDBs have a history of bringing financing and 
expertise to bear in countries hit by financial shocks—not 
duplicating the role of the IMF dealing with balance of pay-
ments needs, but working with fiscal and program authorities 
to address budget issues, as in Mexico in 1994–95. Legacy 
MDBs have built or reformed social insurance programs with 
countercyclical effects that have endured, as in Southeast Asia 
after the 1997–98 financial crisis. And they have created tem-
porary trade finance support to stabilize trade flows, as in Latin 
America in 2009–10. The MDBs have also proven critical in 
the reconstruction efforts that follow conflict and crisis, as 
in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake and in Côte d’Ivoire 
with the cessation of civil conflict in 2011.
In cases involving balance of payments issues, the IMF has 
a clear leading role, but the MDBs also appropriately provide 
additional fiscal support in many of these situations. Dur-
ing the global financial crisis, MDB financing disbursements 
exceeded those of the IMF (Table 1). As the number of MDBs 
grows, it is critical that responses to macroeconomic crises are 
well coordinated. 
In recent years, the role of MDBs has been as or more 
critical in the face of nonfinancial crises rooted in fragile or 
conflict-ridden settings, or following natural disasters: the 
West African Ebola outbreak, the ongoing refugee crisis asso-
ciated with conflict in Syria, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 
the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines, and the 2004 tsunami 
in Indonesia. 
Some of today’s crises can be prevented in the future, but 
will require new regional and global mechanisms of risk 
management and insurance, with MDBs and especially the 
World Bank playing a role in developing new products.62 Still, 
we know shocks will continue to hit in some form, somewhere, 
soon. The MDBs in principle provide an infrastructure allow-
ing the global community to respond quickly, with their own 
finance and staff, and by coordinating and convening other 
international and national responders.
Our recommendations 
4. Embracing crisis response as a core mandate, requiring 
more boldness and flexibility. The proposed shift to regional 
MDBs for routine traditional lending will free up the World 
Bank to arm itself better for unpredictable contingencies and 
emergencies, particularly those that represent global bads by 
virtue of being cross-border and at a potential scale to have 
regional or global consequences. All MDBs should assess exist-
ing policies and operations to better address crisis situations, 
including the ability to respond in a timely and effective way 
to help meet reconstruction needs in post-conflict situations. 
If we view the world through a crisis lens, it should come 
as no surprise that country demand for MDB financing has 
been growing. The global shock that caused MDB lending 
to spike in 2008–10 has been followed by a series of crises 
in the developing world of various sorts: regional and global 
pandemics like Ebola and Zika;63 major refugee and humani-
62. Under the leadership of Caroline Anstey, the World Bank in 2007 
launched a Caribbean disaster insurance fund to help countries finance 
critical services in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Countries pay annual 
premiums into the fund for access.
63. The World Bank response to the Ebola crisis in just three countries 
consumed more than 60 percent of IDA’s crisis response resources, which 
were intended to cover three years of contingency for all IDA countries.
Crisis management and post-
conflict reconstruction
Chapter 4
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tarian crises associated with conflict in Syria and Iraq; and 
the increasing fragility in growth prospects throughout the 
developing world associated with China’s slowdown. Each of 
these situations calls for an MDB response in financing and 
expertise in coordination with UN humanitarian agencies 
and other critical service providers.
However, the current structure of the legacy MDBs is not 
well suited to respond. Flexibility in the use of both core and 
contingent resources is limited by longstanding institutional 
silos that govern concessional, non-concessional, and private 
sector lending by rigid resource allocation mechanisms64 and 
by excessive reliance on ad hoc donor conferences. 
The Syrian refugee crisis has highlighted the fact that seem-
ingly short-term humanitarian crises are in fact long term 
and, as such, could benefit from the sustained development-
oriented engagement of MDBs. Today, more than 50 million 
people globally are displaced by conflict, and most are hosted 
by developing countries.65 Although less publicized in West-
ern headlines than the refugee crisis facing Europe, Kenya’s 
Dadaab refugee camp is the world’s largest, hosting more 
than 300,000 displaced persons today, many now second and 
third generation since the camp’s founding in 1992. While 
the humanitarian needs in places like Dadaab are acute, it is 
clear that the challenge of developing countries hosting highly 
vulnerable refugee populations also requires the financing and 
programming of MDBs, aimed at promoting things like job 
64. Both the “performance” allocation mechanisms of the concessional 
loan windows and the prudential rules associated with the hard loan win-
dows can be overly limiting in cases that call for a rapid, but temporary, 
scaling up in resources for individual countries.
65. Miliband and Gurumurthy 2015.
creation and education in ways that serve the refugee popula-
tions in and out of the camps. 
Embracing crisis response as a core mandate will require 
tackling these problems and constraints within the MDBs, as 
well as a clearer division of responsibilities among institutions 
and further development of expertise within the MDBs. The 
coordinating platform the World Bank or another MDB can 
provide in response to natural disasters or pandemics should 
be recognized as a global/regional public good and prioritized, 
particularly as the number of institutional actors increases 
worldwide. At the same time, there will be situations where 
the MDB role should be secondary and limited to quickly 
mobilizing financing.
Appropriate provisioning for crisis risk, including explor-
ing innovative insurance mechanisms tailored to particular 
types of crises, should be a priority across the MDBs. This 
starts with a clear commitment to establishing and main-
taining contingency resources. The World Bank’s IDA Crisis 
Response Window has proven the utility in setting aside a 
small amount of IDA’s grant resources (about $300 million a 
year) as a contingency for crisis response. In its short existence, 
the window has been deployed in response to the Ebola crisis 
as well as natural disasters in Nepal and Haiti.
Contingency resources also apply to the MDBs’ non-
concessional financing. When shareholders press for balance 
sheets to be stretched to expand non-concessional lending, 
often in ways that we support elsewhere in this report, they 
need to be mindful of the effect on the institutions’ abil-
ity to scale up support in moments of large-scale regional or 
global crises. The World Bank’s ability to increase lending 
significantly during 2008–09 depended on a prior period 
of lending well below capacity. It is also the case that each of 
Table 1: IFI financial flows, fiscal years 2009–10 (US$ billions)
IFI Gross commitments Gross disbursements
World Bank Group without MIGA 128.7 80.6
IMF 219 67
Other IFIs 81.7 56.4
Source: Independent Evaluation Group 2010b.
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the World Bank’s four capital increases has followed periods 
of crisis response.
These patterns generally argue for restraint in procyclical 
lending that does not otherwise meet a compelling devel-
opment need, particularly at the World Bank, where we are 
not calling for consideration of new capital. At the regional 
MDBs, considerations of new capital can better take into 
account the role that countercyclical responses might play in 
the years ahead.
MDB lending can be appropriate in crisis circumstances 
even for higher income countries, but—consistent with our 
call for differentiated loan pricing at the World Bank—with 
harder lending terms for those countries to reflect their longer 
term capacity to pay. For example, the World Bank’s crisis 
package for South Korea in 1997 was on significantly harder 
terms than normal IBRD lending. 
Finally, as indicated in Recommendation 3, there needs 
to be an ex ante reconsideration of the rules that determine 
concessionality in MDB lending, which have become overly 
rigid and too narrowly cast as a general matter, particularly 
from the standpoint of crisis response. Nothing highlights 
the need for such a reconsideration better than the problems 
associated with displaced and refugee populations, whether 
they are hosted by low-income or middle-income countries. 
Recognizing that these humanitarian crises also pose longer 
term development challenges, MDB shareholders should seek 
to deploy concessional resources in support of these popula-
tions wherever they are hosted in the developing world.
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The challenge: Governance and 
beyond
The first four recommendations by our panel represent an 
ambitious agenda for the MDBs. Meeting that ambition 
requires that the banks’ shareholders embrace the MDBs, 
including the new ones, as a system with greater differentiation 
in mandates and roles, particularly between the World Bank 
and the regional banks. But there are very few instances where 
system thinking has taken hold. The G20’s coordination of 
MDB responses to the global financial crisis, reflected at the 
time of the London and Pittsburgh G20 Leaders’ summits, 
are rare exceptions and would suggest that the G20 itself has 
a role to play. 
Representing most of the MDBs’ largest shareholders, the 
G20 exemplifies a tradeoff between expedient decision making 
and broader legitimacy. Unfortunately, outside a moment of 
global crisis, the G20 has not proved expedient on the kind of 
MDB system agenda we identify here. In fact, the G20’s devel-
opment agenda, which points to a central role for the MDBs, 
tends to reinforce the fragmented and ad hoc approaches that 
have undermined a strategic approach for the MDBs as a 
whole. That agenda has tasked MDBs with countless reports 
and white papers across hundreds of topics and subtopics with 
little high-level decision making. 
An example of an area that deserves particular shareholder 
attention on a cross-MDB basis pertains to shareholder gov-
ernance of the different banks, if governance tensions are not 
to become a barrier to progress on the agenda laid out in this 
report. In the recent past, for example, donors to concessional 
windows like IDA have been reluctant to cede control over 
the uses of concessional resources. And developing country 
shareholders have been suspicious of a GPG agenda that indi-
rectly might raise their own cost of borrowing for traditional 
project lending or, in the case of low-income borrowers, might 
compete with contributions to the concessional windows. 
Safeguard issues have sometimes led to borrower resentment 
because they are seen as imposed by US and European share-
holders concerned with reducing reputational risk without 
attention to associated costs and delays (see Appendix 5).66 
The members of this panel believe that addressing problems 
of governance is fundamental to the success of all MDBs, and 
especially to the success of the World Bank in taking up its 
new, more explicit role in ramping up provisions and financ-
ing of global public goods for development. But the members 
choose to endorse rather than add to the recommendations in 
the 2009 report of the Zedillo Commission on World Bank 
governance, which apply in one measure or another to the 
regional banks and the two new banks as well.67 In sum, the 
five Zedillo Commission recommendations are: 
• Voting and Board chair realignment (in favor of borrowers).
• Elevation of the Board role to strategy and oversight.
• Rules-based leadership process open to all nationalities.
• Strengthening Board tools to hold management 
accountable.
• A bigger resource base, including to allow greater voice of 
borrowers.68 
Among those recommendations, there has been good progress 
on voting realignment (in favor of borrowers), including the 
commitment to five-year reviews of shareholding, and to an 
increase in capital (in 2010) that aided in that realignment. 
66. This contentious dynamic has been a major factor in delayed consid-
eration of safeguard reforms at the World Bank, as well as in introducing 
new instruments like the Program for Results, which aims to reduce the 
bank’s ex ante safeguard compliance procedures.
67. Zedillo 2009. Ahluwalia and Fraga, both members of this panel, also 
were members of the Zedillo Commission.
68. See Appendix 6 for a full summary of the Zedillo Commission 
recommendations.
A shareholder-led MDB agenda
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There also has been progress in supporting a more open pro-
cess in the selection of the president, but the current process 
still falls short of the transparent and merit-based process 
first called for by the Development Committee and the G20 
in 2008 and reiterated in subsequent years. 
But the primary concern of the Zedillo Commission related 
to the weakness of the corporate governance function, with 
poor strategic oversight by shareholders and lack of adequate 
tools to hold management accountable. This concern has not 
been addressed,69 and today the same could be said of the 
other legacy MDBs. 
Applying the conclusions of the earlier commission across 
the MDBs, we see a clear need for an approach by sharehold-
ers that takes more decisive stances on strategic issues (GPGs 
versus more generic project lending, for example), but allows 
for more flexibility when it comes to day-to-day corporate 
management issues. The legacy MDBs have become overly 
bureaucratic, rigid, and rule-driven in large part because of 
shareholder governance that has failed to distinguish between 
appropriate strategic oversight (combined with accountability 
measures) and issues more appropriately within the purview 
of management. 
Further, in line with our panel’s emphasis on ensuring stra-
tegic attention at the highest political levels to the MDBs in 
and beyond the G20, the panel believes it would make sense 
that the election of the World Bank president be taken at the 
level of the governors (so that each country’s weighted vote is 
counted directly) as is the case at the regional MDBs, not as 
currently delegated to the 24-member board of directors.70 
69. Including board seat consolidation (to reduce seats) and elevation of 
the seniority of board members.
70. Among other problems with this approach: there are mixed combina-
tions of creditors and borrowers on many of the 24 board chairs, diluting 
further the impetus for political agreements among all members, as occurs 
at the regional banks.
(See Appendix 6 for a description of governance arrangements 
at each of the MDBs.)
Ultimately conflicts around key strategic issues for the 
MDBs can be resolved only by a shared conviction among all 
shareholders that overall governance of each MDB continues 
to be legitimate. The alternative is a system in which factions 
of countries move to control rival MDBs, resulting in a bal-
kanized system that will simply not be up to the tasks we have 
laid out in this report.
Looking beyond questions of governance within each 
MDB, we see the need for a different approach to system-
wide governance from the MDB shareholders. Specifically, 
we see value in convening MDB governors (the minister-level 
shareholder representatives) every five years to engage in a 
cross-MDB review of resources and policy, the MDB Quin-
quennial Review. The review would rely on the constituency 
model of the World Bank’s Development Committee, and 
would enable a strategic approach to the cross-MDB agenda by 
promoting direct consideration of relative resource needs and 
operational comparative advantages among the institutions. 
Although the Development Committee itself has largely 
become a pro forma body, its constituency-based model could 
form the basis for a cross-MDB strategic planning process in 
which 25 governors representing the MDBs’ 188 shareholders 
convene to address questions of resources and programmatic 
differentiation, coordination, and harmonization among the 
MDBs every five years. This process would require a cross-
MDB secretariat, funded and staffed by all the participating 
MDBs. 
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It has been a pleasure and privilege to be part of this prestigious 
working group assembled to envision an MDB system fit-for-
purpose for the 20th century. I fully endorse the ambition of 
the CDG to launch such a public discussion and would hope 
that this effort might prompt others to do the same. While 
the report raises many new ideas and questions, I am unable 
to endorse the content of the paper in its entirety but rather 
suggest that a number of these proposed ideas are worthy of 
further research and debate. My principal areas of concern 
are as follows. 
In considering the state of international development today, 
it is critical to speak not just about poverty or growth, but also 
about the growing inequalities between and within countries. 
The Bank, Fund, and World Economic Forum all acknowl-
edge the widening gap between rich and poor, its impact on 
growth, and its detriment to the achievement of sustainable 
development. We simply cannot ignore the programs, policies, 
and structures that are accelerating the widening of such gaps. 
I think this perspective needs to be underlined more force-
fully in any further discussion on the future of the MDBs. 
One of the reasons we are having this discussion today is the 
changing landscape of development: new national, regional, 
and international financial players, a bigger role for the private 
sector, and lively discussion on impact investing, etc. What 
separates the MDBs in this fast-changing context, however, 
is their specific mandate to reduce poverty. I therefore believe 
that it is imperative that the starting point for any such dis-
cussion on the future of the MDBs acknowledge up front the 
centrality of the poverty reduction mandates to the vision and 
purpose of the MDBs. While I would certainly recognize the 
role of global public goods (GPGs) in addressing different 
dimensions of poverty and inequality (and might go so far as 
to suggest including the area of international tax regulation, 
which is not mentioned in this paper, as a new GPGs area for 
focus), and perhaps even recommend making it an explicit 
and major pillar of work, I would continue to argue that the 
overarching mission and mandate of the World Bank (and 
other MDBs) must remain the fight to eliminate extreme 
poverty.
Among its recommendations, the paper proposes that the 
World Bank should increase its focus on the GPGs and that 
when it comes to standard country operations, donors should 
concentrate future resources on regional banks. When viewed 
from an aid effectiveness (OECD Busan agreements) and a 
proximity standpoint, this could make sense. However, each 
of the legacy MDBs has developed unique competencies and 
organizational cultures. If we consider the added value of 
each institution, where their strengths and technical expertise 
lie, the relationships they have, particularly with donors and 
governments, and ultimately the capacity and experience they 
each have built up over time, such a change in focus (which 
could arguably entail the World Bank doing increasingly fewer 
country operations) may not be easy or optimal. It may make 
more sense to build on existing added value and the invest-
ments built up over decades. We also have to recognize how 
challenging it is to change institutions, their cultures, their 
staffing, and the expectations that their development partners 
have of them. 
Finally, I’d like to comment on an issue which came up 
throughout the paper both implicitly and explicitly—the 
subject of environmental and social safeguards. The paper 
presents safeguards as a burdensome, costly process which 
has frustrated borrowing countries. What is not highlighted 
is that these policies are considered by many constituencies, 
not just NGOs but companies and even the investment com-
munity, to be one of the MDBs’ most significant added values. 
Increasingly, strong environmental and social outcomes are 
being seen as development outcomes in themselves—especially 
when you move from a system of “do no harm” to “do good.” 
Investing in properly evaluating social and environmental risks 
Note of dissent from Ray Offenheiser 
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and ensuring community consent may be time consuming, 
but due diligence in these areas will ensure a much higher 
likelihood of a sustainable development project in the long 
run. In other words, good development takes time. On the 
inefficiency question, there seems to be a tendency to blame 
the safeguards rather than evaluating the full array of poten-
tial causes for delay. I would suggest that this is the moment 
to review the reasons for inefficiencies in greater depth and 
consider innovative solutions. Such solutions may include 
harmonizing safeguards across MDBs, and capacity building 
around countries’ environmental and social systems. Ulti-
mately though, no solution should have the result of putting 
people or the environment at greater risk.
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The multilateral development banks (MDBs) all make some 
contribution, directly and through the investments they 
finance, to the provision of certain global public goods—what 
might be called development-relevant global public goods 
(DR-GPGs). 
In this appendix, we explain what we mean by DR-GPGs 
and set out examples of a subset of DR-GPGs in which the 
MDBs could play a greater role. The subset is in four devel-
opment areas in which many potential programs and invest-
ments have substantial global spillovers—health, agriculture, 
climate/energy, and development policy research)—and on 
which the multilateral development banks and especially the 
World Bank have substantial competence. We offer rough 
estimates of annual spending by official funders on these DR-
GPGs in the last decade and provide a brief history of support 
for DR-GPGs at the World Bank to those four areas. (See 
Appendix 2 for a discussion of how a broader and clearer 
mandate on DR-GPGs could be financed at the World Bank.)
Global public goods that are 
development-relevant
Public goods are defined as those that are non-excludable (no 
single provider can capture all the benefits of provision) and 
non-rivalrous (more for me does not imply less for you). Theory 
suggests that public goods (policing, pollution control, immu-
nizations, management of public parks, some forms of social 
insurance) likely are inadequately provided and financed, espe-
cially where collective agreement is hard to reach because gov-
ernments are weak and unable to tax citizens adequately to 
provide such goods, or are otherwise dysfunctional in reaching 
and maintaining an adequate consensus on the provision of 
such goods.71
Whatever the challenge of providing public goods at the 
local and national levels, that challenge is greater (and thus 
even less likely to be met) in achieving optimal provision and 
financing of such goods at the global level—the provision 
of global public goods. Few would argue, for example, that 
financing climate mitigation programs is adequate, let alone 
optimal for the world at the moment, relative to provision and 
financing of national security in most countries. 
Some global public goods (and bads) are particularly impor-
tant for developing countries and their people. We estimate 
elsewhere, on the basis of Birdsall and Leo (2011),72 that in 
2012 about $14 billion was spent by high-income donor coun-
tries on these DR-GPGs, compared with total spending on 
all official development assistance to developing countries of 
more than $130 billion. 
DR-GPGs for which the MDBs have 
special competence
The MDBs have obvious competence on some DR-GPGs, 
but not all. For example, the protection of sea trade lanes that 
undergirds the global trading system and United Nations 
peacekeeping operations are outside of their remit, and thus 
their competence. However, in sectors such as health, energy, 
and agriculture, MDB staff are familiar with the full range of 
technical and economic issues that matter for the provision 
of DR-GPG products and programs because of their main-
stream activity: developing and financing country operations. 
71. Ostrom 1990.
72. For a full description of the areas and organizations included in this 
estimate, see Birdsall and Diofasi (2015), and Birdsall and Leo (2011).
MDBs and development-
relevant global public goods
Appendix 1
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In the area of data and related development policy research, 
all MDBs have contributed directly through staff work and 
indirectly through support for work within and by developing 
countries, with benefits for other countries. 
In the health sector, some operations at the country level 
(though not all) provide not only national benefits to the 
country borrower but also global benefits. These include com-
petence in surveillance and rapid reporting of communicable 
diseases such as Ebola, flu, cholera, and Zika; country-based 
programs to eliminate the malaria vector and universalize 
polio vaccination; and rapid response to an outbreak of cholera 
and other diseases easily spread across borders following natu-
ral disasters. MDB legal and financial competence combined 
with knowledge of country health systems has made it sensible 
for the World Bank to manage contributions to new financing 
mechanisms, such as the Advance Market Commitment73 and 
the International Finance Facility for Immunizations.74 The 
same could be said of any insurance or re-insurance program 
for countries to subscribe to that would disburse rapidly to 
help finance a rapid response to the spread of a pandemic.
In agriculture, the World Bank has a history of supporting 
basic research and development through science and technol-
ogy loans in Brazil and other middle-income countries. Staff 
familiarity through country operations with technical and 
institutional constraints to increasing agricultural production 
and productivity was relevant to the World Bank’s influence 
on the crop research programs at many of the centers of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) and to the reform of CGIAR, including the decision 
to close some centers, and to the policy research programs of 
the International Food Policy Research Institute and of the 
Center for International Forestry Research. 
For climate mitigation, the World Bank in the late 1980s 
helped create the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its 
staff helped countries plan and manage GEF projects includ-
ing forest conservation (more than $4.8 billion in GEF grants 
since 1991). Since its inception, the GEF program has sup-
ported more than 790 projects in 120 countries, and it now has 
a current portfolio of 200 active investments with increasing 
73. Advance Market Commitment Working Group 2005.
74. Barder 2005.
attention to climate change. The longstanding economic and 
technical work of the World Bank in tropical forestry and land 
use in the context of country lending is now relevant to GEF 
work on creating a global market in bio-carbon. 
Several donors have financed Climate Investment Funds 
(as trust funds) at the World Bank, with resources deployed 
in the form of grants and loans to developing countries for 
climate mitigation programs and projects. The funds comprise 
the Clean Technology Fund ($3.3 billion worth of investments 
approved to date) and the Strategic Climate Fund. The Stra-
tegic Climate Fund in turn comprises the Forest Investment 
Program ($208 million approved and under implementa-
tion), the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience ($777 million 
approved and under implementation), and the Scaling UP 
Renewable Energy in Low-Income Countries program ($136 
million approved and under implementation).
In energy, all the legacy MDBs have experience in the 
power sector now relevant to tackling the challenges of cli-
mate change—including technical and financial analysis of 
alternative programs given ongoing technological changes, 
and understanding of the respective roles of private investors 
compared with governments in producing, transmitting, dis-
tributing, and pricing power. All MDBs have experience in 
the local financing of power and how to reform it, including 
replacing fossil fuel subsidies with cash transfer programs. 
A fourth category is data collection and curation, along 
with associated research and evaluation at MDBs or supported 
by them at outside organizations. The World Bank’s work on 
defining and measuring absolute poverty is a classic example. 
Its staff coordinates the collection and processing of price 
data used for purchasing power parity adjustments through 
the International Comparison Program.75 
Spending on DR-GPGs 
Current annual spending by all donors on DR-GPGs where 
MDBs have special competence, at or through the MDBs 
themselves, is difficult to estimate. None of the MDBs report 
on the share of their administrative or program budgets spent 
75. World Bank 2014.
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on GPGs, nor do the UN agencies or bilateral donors in any 
systematic way. No standard definition of which administra-
tive and program expenditures should count as GPG expen-
ditures exists among official funders. 
A rough estimate, built up from data for 2008–12, of 
total GPG-related transfers to developing countries (exclud-
ing spending in the United States and other high-income 
countries on their own R&D infrastructure with many global 
spillovers) is about $14 billion a year, or just over 10 percent of 
annual spending on official development assistance to benefit 
developing countries directly in that period.76 More than half 
of the $14 billion figure, however, was for contributions to UN 
peacekeeping, with additional amounts for IMF surveillance 
and selected WHO activities. It follows that as little as $7 
billion a year has been disbursed for the DR-GPGs where the 
development banks could be more active, with the proviso that 
the average annual amounts for 2013–15 could be somewhat 
greater if recent donor pledges to finance transfers to develop-
ing countries for climate mitigation had begun to disburse.77 
We developed an alternative estimate for official funding 
of DR-GPGs in 2014 by adding up disbursements by both 
bilateral and multilateral donors in DR-GPG relevant sectors 
listed in the OECD’s Credit Reporting System and that cover 
areas like medical research, solar power generation, and so and 
76. Birdsall and Diofasi 2015.
77. A much larger and better known figure for 2014 of $62 billion for 
climate alone is reported in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development and Climate Policy Initiative, “Climate Finance in 2013–14 
and the USD 100 Billion Goal.” That figure includes commitments (not 
disbursements) for public projects and programs funded in partnership 
with private investors. However, we exclude commitments for climate 
adaptation programs because they lack global spillovers. There is much 
debate about which funds should be counted and how; in the joint report 
with CPI, the OECD estimated that public entities (including MDBs) 
mobilized about $43 billion in climate finance in 2014 alone. A subse-
quent review of these figures by the Indian Government’s Climate Change 
Finance Unit (“Climate Change Finance, Analysis of a Recent OECD 
Report: Some Credible Facts Needed”) found that if only disbursements 
of grant-equivalent climate finance were counted, total climate financing 
in 2014 would come to below $5 billion.
so on.78 That number added up to $7 billion as well. A tripling 
of that number would not be sufficient to cover the funding 
called for to support climate mitigation alone in developing 
countries, for which the high-income countries promised $50 
billion a year by 2020.79
As a single example of the potential overall funding gap for 
DR-GPGs, the figure on the table to address the global risk of 
growing resistance to antibiotics is $20 billion.80 Spending on 
DR-GPGs by major foundations is far smaller, though their 
leadership, particularly that of the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, has been important in defining issues and devel-
oping programs. Our very rough estimate is that the major 
foundations and other philanthropies have spent about $1.5 
billion a year in the last five years on DR-GPGs, including 
about $1 billion by the Gates Foundation on health, primar-
ily for R&D in tropical diseases. Because the total resources 
of the major foundations are small relative to the needs they 
see, they are keen on working with and increasing the role of 
the MDBs.
Current World Bank programs in 
support of development-relevant 
GPGs
There is no well-established list of World Bank finances going 
toward DR-GPGs. The budget for global engagement and 
global practice management in the World Bank’s adminis-
trative budget for FY15 totaled $280 million,81 compared 
with the budget of $940 million for country engagement 
and regional program management. Even from this small 
78. Includes total disbursements by bilateral and multilateral donors in 
the categories of medical research, infectious disease control, renewable 
power generation, solar energy, wind power, geothermal energy, energy 
research, agricultural research, environmental research, and support for 
research/scientific institutions.
79. The better known $100 billion figure pledged by donors.
80. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and Cli-
mate Policy Initiative 2015.
81. This includes spending on administrative offices in the World Bank 
that probably would not be defined as GPG provision.
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global budget, only a fraction goes toward financing global 
public goods. 
For decades, a small amount has been set aside from the 
bank’s core budget (its own annual net income) for grants to 
programs that it manages. The Grant-Making Facility (GMF) 
includes the Development Grant Facility as well as Bank con-
tributions to CGIAR. However, the GMF will be phased out 
over the next three years, with funding already on the decline. 
The Development Grant Facility’s budget shrank more than 40 
percent in the last two years, from $56 million in 2013 to $33 
million in 2015 (Table A1.1). Contributions to the CGIAR, 
a group of international research centers that have been at the 
forefront of agriculture R&D to improve crops and agricul-
tural technologies in developing countries, will also decline, 
dropping from $50 million to zero by 2018. 
In value terms, most of the World Bank’s engagement in 
the category of DR-GPGs has been financed via donor-funded 
trust funds. Of the more than 3,800 trust funds housed at the 
World Bank between 2005 and 2015, some were in the cat-
egory of DR-GPGs, in particular supporting climate-relevant 
projects and initiatives. Our initial analysis—based on the 
names of the trust funds, given the limited additional infor-
mation available82—suggests that of the $43.5 billion paid 
in to the numerous trust funds at the World Bank over the 
82. It would take many person-days to do this adequately. A major review 
of spending in health that constitutes provision of global public goods is 
under way. See Schäferhoff et al. (2015).
past decade, about $5.7 billion supported DR-GPG related 
activities (Figure A1.1).83 Of these, about $4.3 billion (or 77 
percent of the total) was dedicated to climate, with smaller 
amounts going toward disease prevention, research, and proj-
ects to finance global trade and crisis prevention activities. The 
largest of these has been the Clean Technology Fund, one of 
the Climate Investment Funds referred to above.
The World Bank has also supported transformative research 
and development (R&D) programs in developing countries. 
The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank 
identified a lending portfolio of 80 projects that included 
R&D funding (24 projects) or R&D capacity building (56 
projects) between 2000 and 2012. The projects mostly focused 
on agricultural R&D, using competitive research grants as the 
mechanism to identify the most capable research providers. For 
instance, the Peru Agricultural Research and Extension Proj-
ect, implemented in 1999, included an agricultural technology 
83. We counted trust funds, where we could reasonably assume from their 
names that they were earmarked for climate change mitigation efforts; 
those that supported the research, development, and effective distribu-
tion of vaccines and the prevention of pandemics; those committed to 
agricultural research and development; those committed to building a 
more resilient global economy (via efforts to support global trade or the 
prevention and management of global financial crises); and those con-
cerned with data collection and support for statistical offices. This is a first 
effort—led by Priscilla Agyapong—to identify DR-GPG related projects, 
so these figures should be considered as estimates.
Table A1.1: Actual and planned budget allocation for the World Bank’s grant-making facilities
Facility (in US$ millions) FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
State and Peace-Building Fund
Institutional Development Fund 17 9 0
Development Grant Facility 56 51 33
Global Partnership for Social Accountability 5 5 5
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research 50 50 47
GMF Total (new baseline) 161 115 110 69 24 0
GMF Total (old baseline) 161 115 115 115 115 115
Put in IBRD reserves 0 0 5 47 91 115
 Source: World Bank 2014.
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fund that provided competitive research grants to research and 
extension institutions and institutional strengthening activi-
ties to help build capacity in the national technology system. 
The World Bank provides a global public good through its 
role in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data. Its vari-
ous databases, including the World Development Indicators 
database and PovcalNet, are a treasure trove of information 
for scholars, researchers, and policymakers worldwide. The 
Development Research Group provides extensive economic 
and social research meant to guide policy and investments. 
It was allocated $52 million for the current fiscal year, with a 
reduction in funds of more than 9 percent expected in the next 
two years, to $47 million by 2017. As noted, the World Bank 
also supports the compilation of global purchasing power par-
ity data financed via the International Comparison Program 
(ICP) Global Trust Fund, the ICP Global Office (located at 
the bank’s headquarters in Washington, DC), and the Multi-
Donor Trust Fund, which provides grants and technical assis-
tance to regional and national statistical bodies. (The total 
budget for the 2011 ICP compilation, including the regional 
program budget, was about $37 million.) 
A DR-GPG window at the World 
Bank
How might the $10 billion of resources recommended in this 
report be spent annually on DR-GPGs? 
1. Direct grant financing of R&D. This would be aimed 
at technological progress in agriculture (production of 
food); clean(er) low-carbon energy; and health (vaccines 
and medicines), whether in developing countries (science 
and technology loans financing agricultural or health 
R&D, as in Brazil and South Africa) or through such 
international programs as CGIAR for agriculture. Direct 
grants could be made to third parties such as CGIAR, or 
to specific programs of other organizations and institu-
tions such as WHO, and to other MDBs. The ability to 
set priorities and make grants would build on the expe-
rience and expertise of staff at the World Bank—with 
grants above some level approved by the board of the 
GPG window. 
2. Financial support on more concessional terms to invest-
ments and services in developing countries that generate 
benefits at the global level along with domestic benefits, 
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Source: World Bank Group Finances. 
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particularly in agriculture, energy, and health. This cat-
egory provides key additional financing for the GPG ele-
ment of mainstream operations, exploiting the MDBs’ 
traditional expertise in working with borrowers to pre-
pare and manage country projects and programs financed 
through loans to sovereigns. Obvious examples include 
subsidies to cover the incremental costs of a country 
investing in cleaner (clean coal, natural gas, solar, and 
wind) but more costly energy systems; a grant element 
in a loan to support reduction of deforestation in a par-
ticular country; a grant element or other greater level of 
concessionality to pay the extra costs of an evaluation of 
an agricultural extension program; or the total cost of a 
country program to strengthen disease surveillance and 
pandemic preparedness systems. In the case of climate-
friendly investments, increases in the effective price of 
carbon and technological breakthroughs in producing 
clean energy could eventually reduce the need for this 
kind of financing, with the possible exception of support 
for first movers or making markets in country invest-
ments that represent innovations that provide benefits 
at the global level. 
3. Provision of data and policy research relevant to economic 
development. This could include program evaluation and 
grant support for such work in developing countries; 
data collection, analysis, and dissemination; evaluation 
of development projects and programs; and financial 
support for these functions in other organizations (as in 
the ICP or the International Initiative for Independent 
Evaluation) and in developing countries (for example, 
support for the African Economic Research Consor-
tium, the Global Development Network, and country 
statistical bureaus’ census and other data collection and 
analysis functions). This third category makes explicit 
the global public good nature of data (design, collection, 
curatorship, user-friendly access) and policy research on all 
aspects of economic and social development, both inside 
the bank funded by the administrative budget and outside 
the bank in developing countries funded through direct 
grants. (The $10 billion window should be additional to 
the administrative budget of the World Bank that covers 
its own research staff.)
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During the global financial crisis, MDB shareholders called 
on the institutions to further leverage their balance sheets in 
order to lend at higher volumes into the crisis.84 Since then, 
the discussion on better use of MDB balance sheets has been 
sustained, most prominently in the G20.85 The balance sheet 
optimization agenda at MDBs implicates a number of areas 
including loan pricing, credit ratings, and portfolio risk swaps. 
But perhaps the biggest boost to this agenda came from the 
Asian Development Bank’s (AsDB) 2015 decision to merge 
its concessional and non-concessional balance sheets.
Under the AsDB merger, the assets of the concessional loan 
window, the Asian Development Fund (AsDF), are treated 
as equity and brought onto the bank’s core balance sheet. 
The AsDF equity, comprised of $30.8 billion in loans out-
standing and $7.2 billion in liquidity/receivables, effectively 
triples AsDB capital to $53 billion. The expanded capital base 
increases overall lending capacity by 50 percent. Countries 
eligible for concessional funding will continue to be served in 
two ways. The poorest grant-only countries will continue to 
be supported by AsDF donor contributions. The other AsDF 
countries will continue to receive concessional lending from 
the newly combined balance sheet, with the cost of conces-
sionality absorbed by the balance sheet. 
84. This note is drawn from Birdsall, Morris, and Rueda-Sabater (2014).
85. G20 2015.
The AsDB merger has been described as win-win-win. 
AsDF countries see expanded access to lending; AsDB coun-
tries also see expanded access (on non-concessional terms); and 
AsDF donors see a 50 percent reduction in their contributions 
to the grant fund as a result of a smaller pool of countries.
Discussions are now under way at the World Bank to con-
sider some version of the AsDB model, and it is useful to 
consider how the numbers might differ. For example, the 
IDA “equity” equivalent to the AsDF equity at the AsDB 
is currently about $175 billion. This compares with current 
IBRD usable equity of about $40 billion. So, on the supply 
side, there is much more bang for the buck in employing IDA 
equity at the World Bank than there was in employing AsDF 
equity at the AsDB. 
However, the demand side also differs, and here there is 
less certainty. The composition of borrowers—those requiring 
concessional lending terms and their size relative to non-con-
cessional borrowers—clearly differs between the two institu-
tions. Nonetheless, we can draw some firm conclusions even 
with this limited information. Some leveraging of IDA equity, 
whether through a full merger of IDA-IBRD balance sheets or 
something more limited, would generate additional financing 
capacity, including additional concessional financing capacity. 
This implies that at the same level of IDA donor contributions 
there would be more grant financing capacity available within 
MDB balance sheet optimization: The 
Asian Development Bank case and 
its implications for the World Bank
Appendix 2
Table A2.1: Equity stock of the World Bank and AsDB
 AsDB World Bank
Concessional window equity $38 billion $175 billion
Non-concessional equity $17 billion $40 billion
Combined equity $55 billion $215 billion
 Source: AsDB, World Bank annual reports.
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the institution, even while maintaining the current baseline 
of concessional lending for IDA countries. 
This appears to be confirmed by estimates provided to IDA 
donors by the World Bank. Under various leveraging scenarios, 
the bank estimates that total IDA lending (market-based and 
concessional) can more than double and concessional lending 
alone can increase by 26 percent, even as donor contributions 
to IDA decline (Figure A2.1).
Further, IDA graduation projections point to further grant 
financing capacity over the next decade as additional coun-
tries transition to IBRD lending. Country projections based 
on growth in per capita income suggest the current pool of 
77 IDA countries will shrink considerably by 2025, with esti-
mates of the remaining IDA countries ranging from 33 to 56 
(Table A2.2). 
It is also clear that the remaining pool of IDA countries will 
include a higher concentration of fragile and conflict-affected 
states (FCAS). For some donors, this implies greater financing 
needs, though it seems implausible that these remaining coun-
tries could absorb all of the additional financing capacity 
resulting from IDA graduations and at the current level of 
IDA donor support.
Implications for future World Bank 
financing for DR-GPGs
Grant financing for DR-GPGs at the World Bank has thus far 
been limited by reliance on the administrative budget, which 
affords little scope for large allocations, and on donor-funded 
trust funds. Trust funds have been robust, but given their 
ad hoc nature, they suffer from reliability and do not lend 
themselves to a strategic approach to DR-GPGs. How might 
a robust financing stream look under a revised business model?
Currently, the core grant financing stream in the World 
Bank resides in IDA. Since its founding in 1960, IDA has 
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raised well over $300 billion in grant resources from its donors, 
most of that in recent years. 
Under business as usual, annual reflows (principal and 
instrument payments on outstanding loans) will rise from 
about $4.5 billion to more than $5.5 billion during the next 
8–10 years.86 During the same period, very conservative World 
Bank estimates of IDA country graduations suggest 22 coun-
try graduations, currently accounting for $4 billion in annual 
IDA lending commitments. 
This suggests a floor of $5 billion annually newly avail-
able for a GPG mandate at current levels of IDA donor sup-
port and with a firm baseline commitment for ongoing IDA 
lending. The additional flexibility created by employing IDA 
equity point to considerably more potential for additional 
grant resources becoming available. Through leveraging, not 
only will flat donor contributions yield higher overall lend-
ing, but even concessional lending will increase by $5 billion 
annually by 2030. Given the trajectory for graduations from 
86. World Bank 2013.
traditional IDA borrowing, a $10 billion target for redeploy-
ing grant and concessional lending resources into a DR-GPG 
is highly plausible. 
In fact, it appears likely in this context that donors will 
begin to scale back their contributions to the World Bank over 
the next decade in the absence of a compelling need outside 
traditional IDA, such as the GPG agenda proposed in this 
report.
Governance implications
A merger of balance sheets implies a concomitant merger 
of governance arrangements. As much as the financing and 
policy case for a merger might be compelling, unified gov-
ernance poses significant legal and political barriers. At the 
AsDB, legal challenges were limited because the concessional 
window was not a separate legal entity within the AsDB, 
as IDA is within the World Bank. Yet, consideration of a 
new governance arrangement did pose a political challenge 
Table A2.2: IDA graduation projections
 IDA graduation 
models to 2025
Graduates Remaining in IDA Model Lag? Incl. 
SIDTotal African FCAS
Morris and Gleave 
(2015)
44 33 82% 48% Uses operational GNI 
threshold, WEO 2013 growth 
estimates.
2, 6 years Yes
Reisen and Garroway 
(2014)
11 crossing 
operational; 
12 crossing 
historical.
56 54% 45% Examines only countries 
below operational ($1,205) 
and historical ($1,965) GNI 
thresholds as of 2012, uses 
WEO 2013 estimates.
— Yes
Salvado and Walz 
(2013)
34 31 (+12 
SIDS)
87% 
(–63%) 
74% 
(–53%)
Uses operational GNI 
threshold, WEO 2013 growth 
estimates.
5 years No
Moss and Leo (2011) 29 31 (+17 
SIDS)
81% 
(–52%)
58% 
(–38%)
Uses operational GNI 
threshold, WEO 2009 growth 
estimates.
5 years No
Note: SIDS are small island and developing states.
Source: Morris and Gleave 2015.
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that ultimately proved too difficult to overcome. As a result, 
the AsDB has maintained separate governance arrangements 
for concessional and non-concessional lending, even as the 
finances have been merged.
At the World Bank, shareholders could better con-
sider merged governance given the timing of this exer-
cise. IDA donors are contemplating the future of IDA 
in parallel with broader shareholding reform discus-
sions in the bank. From this perspective, it is worth con-
sidering what consolidated shareholding under a unified 
balance sheet (IDA + IBRD) would look like (Figure A2.2). 
Most striking perhaps is how much the list of winners and los-
ers departs from the typical narrative that has defined previous 
shareholder reforms. For example, under a merger, the United 
States and China cede some shareholding power, while Japan, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom gain slightly. 
In the end, pursuit of a balance sheet merger could proceed 
under a variety of arrangements, and while sensitivity about 
shareholding changes is a factor, it need not be decisive.
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All MDBs engage in private sector development activities, and 
the new MDBs have included private sector development in 
their mandates. The dominant MDB model for private sec-
tor development is direct lending to private firms in develop-
ing countries. By this measure, the EBRD, World Bank, and 
European Investment Bank (EIB) lead among the MDBs 
(Figure A3.1).87
The MDBs have generally followed the IFC’s lead in adher-
ing to commercial standards, which sets financing terms in a 
way that is meant to avoid market distortions. This ethos has 
served to limit private sector activities where subsidies would 
87. Private sector is defined as non-sovereign guaranteed lending and 
investments.
be required, whether in supporting the expansion of clean 
energy markets or targeting high-risk markets and popula-
tions. Nonetheless, these institutions, and the EBRD in par-
ticular, have had some success in promoting private sector 
investments in clean energy. Where subsidies are needed, they 
have relied on external donor trust funds, or in the case of the 
EIB, financing from EU sources.
As the private sector orientation of MDBs continues to 
grow, a fundamental consideration relates to additionality—
that is, the degree to which these activities are promoting 
additional development impact beyond what private inves-
tors might be doing on their own. Again, the commitment 
to commercial standards is intended to guard against cheaper 
MDB private sector activities
Appendix 3
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MDB terms driving out private sources of investment.88 But 
more generally, the question of additionality is difficult for 
MDBs to answer in the aggregate. They have tended to mea-
sure operational success primarily by rates of return on proj-
ect investments. By this measure, we can see the “success” of 
these activities at a macro level in the profitability of the IFC 
and EBRD relative to the World Bank’s sovereign lending 
(Table A3.1). 
The MDBs also provide measures of private funds leveraged 
through MDB investments as an indication of additionality. 
Yet simply counting the level of co-investment falls short of 
answering key questions of whether the private funds would 
have invested anyway and whether the investment has con-
tributed meaningfully to the development of private markets.
When it comes to leverage, it is striking how little MDBs 
use guarantee instruments that more clearly crowd in private 
funds relative to direct lending. The World Bank’s private 
guarantee arm, MIGA, accounts for just under 5 percent of 
the bank’s annual commitments (IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA, 
and trust funds). And while the IFC provides guarantees, 
almost all of this activity is in trade finance. 
At the IBRD, using guarantees to better leverage private 
flows to sovereigns has been constrained by the negative 
88. This issue is less clear cut than a commitment to commercial terms 
would suggest. Deal terms are not transparent and are difficult to evaluate. 
For example, the degree to which the core MDBs enjoy preferred credi-
tor status likely confers a benefit on the institutions that leads to better 
financing terms than for purely private actors.
incentives associated with capital provisioning rules.89 These 
rules book guarantees at the face value of the loan and count 
the full value against a country’s IBRD lending cap. As a result, 
there is no incentive for countries to choose guarantees over 
direct lending and as a result, there has been very little use of 
guarantee instruments.
An independent assessment of the IFC’s efforts to track its 
development impact reported generally positive outcomes.90 
Through this evaluation and MDB reporting, it is clear that 
the institutions have had successes in employing a private 
investment model to achieve development aims, whether 
defined as promoting clean energy, supporting access to credit 
for women-owned businesses, or more generally promoting 
basic financial intermediation where it is absent.
But a key question remains about whether these develop-
ment successes define the MDBs’ model, or whether success 
in the aggregate is limited to project profitability. Underlying 
this question is the degree to which the culture embodied in 
the MDBs’ private sector operations is exclusively focused on 
profitability, or if broader development and market objectives 
prevail. 
89. Humphrey and Prizzon 2014.
90. Independent Evaluation Group 2008.
Table A3.1: Private sector activity and profitability, average 2011–14 (US$ millions) 
 IFC EBRD IBRD
Average annual business volume 15,184 11,705 25,074
Average annual profit 1,774 756 899
 Source: Annual reports 2011–14.
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Eligibility for concessional financing at the MDBs is gener-
ally a function of country income level (measured by GNI per 
capita) and measures of country creditworthiness. While this 
approach is commonly understood to focus MDB concessional 
resources on the poorest countries, the reality is different. For 
example, while all low-income countries are eligible for IDA 
financing at the World Bank, IDA lending is not limited to 
those countries, nor are those countries the largest category 
of IDA recipients (Table A4.1). 
Yet, even with the broader scope that country income plus 
country creditworthiness standards provide, critics suggest 
that the effect of the GNI per capita country income stan-
dard has limited the ability of MDBs to provide concessional 
financing terms to address poverty.91
In 1990, 94 percent of the world’s extreme poor lived in 
low-income countries. By 2008, 74 percent of the extreme 
poor lived in middle-income countries.92 Alternative measures 
aimed at distribution of income within countries suggest that 
MDB concessionality thresholds miss many of the world’s 
poor. For example, most countries above the current IDA 
91. Birdsall 2012.
92. Kanbur and Sumner 2012.
graduation threshold at the World Bank have more than half 
of their populations living on less than $4 a day. Similarly, a 
measure of countries’ median incomes reveals that a large num-
ber of countries above the IDA GNI per capita threshold have 
median incomes at or below the IDA threshold (Figure A4.1).
It is not clear how much MDB borrowing countries broadly 
favor concessionality, or at least the conditions that come with 
concessional terms. In particular, there is a tradeoff between 
MDB financing volumes and concessionality. Further, MDB 
non-concessional terms still represent a significant (even high) 
degree of concessionality when compared with the countries’ 
cost of borrowing. For example, India was willing to gradu-
ate from IDA with assurances that its overall access to World 
Bank financing would not decline. 
At the same time, middle-income countries have expressed 
strong interest in concessional financing terms for certain pur-
poses. Recent discussions around management of the Syrian 
refugee crisis make clear that non-IDA countries like Jordan 
desire concessional financing terms from the World Bank 
to address the humanitarian aspects of the crisis. And many 
middle-income countries have long relied on MDB trust funds 
for grant support for particular purposes, such as the AfDB’s 
Middle Income Country Technical Assistance Fund.
Concessional MDB 
lending for the poor
Appendix 4
Table A4.1: Number of countries eligible for World Bank lending by income classification, FY16
IDA Blend IBRD Not 
eligible
Total
Low income 29 1 0 1 31
Lower middle income 26 12 12 1 51
Upper middle income 4 5 42 2 53
High income 0 0 13 67 80
Total 59 18 67 71 215
Source: World Bank Country and Lending Groups database.
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The MDBs employ a wide range of rules and procedures aimed 
at safeguarding their projects from environmental, social, and 
corruption risks. These rules fall under the broad categories of 
environmental/social safeguards and procurement rules. The 
list of prohibited project categories alone gives a sense of the 
detailed procedures that the institutions employ in preparing 
a project (Table A5.1).
This approach to ex ante, rules-based due diligence, includ-
ing the wide scope and depth of rules, is most closely associated 
with MDBs in which the United States is the largest share-
holder. Historically, pressure from the United States, first 
on fiduciary safeguards and over time on environmental and 
social issues, resulted from the particular influence of the 
United States Congress and the active role of NGOs in the 
United States in shaping positions on these issues.
Over time, the accumulation of safeguards has led to a 
backlash among MDB borrowers, who complain about overly 
cumbersome processes and a seeming indifference to their 
MDB safeguards
Appendix 5
Table A5.1: Categorical prohibitions in MDBs safeguard operational policies
AsDB AfDB EBRD EIB IADB IFC
Environmental and social assessment
Projects unacceptable in environmental or social terms     x  
Production or trade of any product or activity deemed illegal under host 
country laws or regulations
x x x x x x
Production or trade of any product or activity deemed illegal under 
international conventions and agreements
x x x  x x
Production or trade of any product or activity subject to international phase 
outs or bans including ozone-depleting substances
x x x  x x
Production of or trade in weapons and munitions x x  x x x
Production of or trade in alcoholic beverages x x   x x
Production of or trade in tobacco x x  x x x
Gambling, casinos, and equivalent enterprises x   x x x
Speculative real estate investing or trading     x  
Production of or trade in radioactive materials including nuclear reactors 
and components 
x x  x x x
Production of, trade in, or use of unbonded asbestos fibers x x x  x x
Large-scale mining, oil and gas exploration development and supporting 
services
    x  
Shipment of oil or other hazardous substances in tankers that do not 
comply with International Maritime Organization requirements
  x    
Platinum, pearls, precious stones, gold, and related products  x     
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AsDB AfDB EBRD EIB IADB IFC
Labor conditions 
Harmful or exploitative forms of child labor x x   x x
Harmful or exploitative forms of forced labor x x   x x
Discriminatory labor practices     x  
Labor practices that prevent employees from freely exercising their right to 
association and collective bargaining
    x  
Noncompliance with workers’ fundamental principles and rights at work     x  
Cultural heritage
Projects with a political or religious content    x   
Ethically or morally controversial projects    x   
Pollution prevention 
International trade in waste products x  x  x  
Production, trade, storage or transport of significant volume of hazardous 
chemicals or commercial-scale usage of hazardous chemicals
x    x x
Persistent organic pollutants     x  
Production of and trade in products containing polychlorinated biphenyls x    x x
Biodiversity
Trade in wildlife or wildlife products regulated under under the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
x x x  x x
Genetically modified organisms    x x  
Driftnet fishing in the marine environment using nets of 2.5 km or more in 
length
x  x  x x
Activities prohibited by host country legislation or international conventions 
relating to the protection of biodiversity resources or cultural heritage
  x    
Forestry projects or operations not consistent with lenders’ environment 
and safeguard compliance policies
    x x
Plantation projects that would require the removal of existing nondegraded 
natural forest
    x  
Significant degradation of critical natural habitats including protected areas, 
parks, and high conservation areas
    x  
Indigenous peoples/community impacts/vulnerable peoples
Abortion clinics    x   
Production or activities that impinge on the lands owned, or claimed under 
adjudication, by indigenous peoples, without full documented consent of 
such peoples
     x
Sex trade and related infrastructure services and media    x   
Projects that result in limiting people’s individual rights and freedom in 
violation of human rights
   x   
Source: Himberg 2015.
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own domestic standards and regulations. This dissatisfaction 
is typically expressed as the hassle factor in working with the 
MDBs. Loan approval times actually vary significantly across 
the US-dominant MDBs, from well over a year at the World 
Bank to just under six months at the IADB (Figure A5.1). 
The World Bank’s most recent corporate scorecard estimates 
that the time from concept note to first project disbursement 
is 26 months.93
Perhaps more telling, the period of time between loan 
commitments and disbursement of funds show the MDBs 
as a group lag considerably behind bilateral creditors (Figure 
A5.2). There can be many reasons for this, not all of which are 
directly related to MDB rules and procedures, but the rules 
are undoubtedly a contributing factor. 
93. Humphrey 2015. A better measure than loan approval time would 
include the additional time between approval and the first disbursement, as 
needed additional time, such as for completing compliance requirements, 
can be pushed to the post-approval period. The total project preparation 
time for the World Bank (concept note to first disbursement) reported on 
the President’s Delivery Unit website is 27 months. The time from approval 
to first disbursement is 12.4 months. We could not find comparable data 
for the major MDBs.
The rules themselves may be indications of the MDB cul-
ture that has grown up around these rules. An independent 
evaluation of World Bank safeguards cites a project managers’ 
report that identifies a culture of fear and paralysis associ-
ated with the safeguards regime.94 The assessment notes that 
inspections of safeguard violations have yielded violations 
in an average of 7 projects a year out of nearly 1,000 projects 
financed annually. This degree of compliance certainly points 
to a culture of extreme risk aversion.
In August 2016, the World Bank’s board adopted a set of 
reforms to the institution’s social and environmental safe-
guards, which simultaneously extend the scope of the safe-
guards to include issues like labor and nondiscrimination and 
introduce more flexibility into the regime through greater 
reliance on countries’ domestic regulatory systems and a risk-
based approach to the application of safeguards. There will 
be an 18-month period to develop implementing rules, and 
evaluation of the practice of these new rules will take a num-
ber of years. 
94. Independent Evaluation Group 2010a.
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Figure A5.1: Loan approval times at select MDBs
Source: Humphrey 2015. 
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The MDBs share key core governance characteristics: pre-
dominantly (or exclusively) sovereign shareholders and voting 
power within the institutions based mostly on shareholding. 
Beyond this, governance varies in a number of ways. 
First, the composition of the largest shareholders varies 
considerably across MDBs, although the United States, more 
frequently than any other country, is either the largest or sec-
ond largest shareholder.
Governance picture at the MDBs
Appendix 6
Table A6.1: Top five shareholders in major MDBs by voting power, 2014
 WB-IBRD  IADB
United States 15.9% United States 30.0%
Japan 6.8% Brazil 10.8%
China 4.4% Argentina 10.8%
Germany 3.8% Mexico 6.9%
France 3.8% Japan 5.0%
 AsDB  AfDB
Japan 12.8% Nigeria 9.3%
United States 12.8% United States 6.6%
China 5.5% Japan 5.5%
India 5.4% Egypt 5.4%
Australia 5.0% South Africa 4.9%
 EBRD  CAF
United States 10.0% Peru 18.7%
France 8.5% Venezuela 18.2%
Germany 8.5% Colombia 18.1%
Italy 8.5% Argentina 8.9%
Japan 8.5% Brazil 7.8%
 AIIB  NDB
China 26.0% Brazil 20.0%
India 7.5% China 20.0%
Russia 5.9% India 20.0%
Germany 4.2% Russia 20.0%
South Korea 3.5% South Africa 20.0%
Source: Annual reports 2014. 
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Table A6.2: Governance
Headquarters Est. Board of Governors Board of Directors
# Composition # Composition Representative Residency
WB Washington, 
DC
1944 188 144 borrowers total 25 11 borrowers; 14 
non-borrowers
5 from largest donors; 
20 from constituencies
Yes
IBRD: 67 
IDA: 59 
Blend: 18 
AsDB Manila, 
Philippines
1966 67 39 borrowers
27 non-borrowers
10 5 borrowers; 5 
non-borrowers
Japan, USA, China have 
their own director; 7 
from constituencies
Yes
48 regional
19 non-regional
7 regional; 3 
non-regional
IADB Washington, 
DC
1959 48 26 borrowers
22 non-borrowers
14 8 borrowers Canada and USA 
select their own 
director; others with 
constituencies
Yes
28 regional
20 non-regional
EBRD London 1990 66 35 borrowers
31 non-borrowers
23 4 borrowers 8 entities have their own 
directors; others with 
constituencies
Yes
64 countries
EU and EIB
AfDB Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire
1964 80 42 borrowers
38 non-borrowers
20 8 borrowers USA has its own 
director. All others in 
constituencies 
Yes
54 regional
26 non-regional
13 regional; 7 
non-regional
EIB Luxembourg 1958 28 26 borrowers 29 25 countries financed and EC No
All regional
IsDB Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia
1975 56 48 borrowers
8 non-borrowers
18 16 borrowers; 2 
non-borrowers
10 countries have their 
own directors and others 
have constituencies.
No
All regional
CAF Caracas, 
Venezuela
1970 33 16 borrowers
17 non-borrowers
18 All borrowers 10 from Series A, 5 from 
Series B
No
19 countries
14 private banks
1 from Corp. and 2 from 
Series C
AIIB Beijing, China 2014 57 20 regional 
37 non-regional
12 9 regional
3 non-regional
No
NDB Shanghai, 
China
2014 5 Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa
10 5 founders
Board of 
Governors 
appoints
No
Source: Articles of Agreement.
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Second, the balance between borrowing and non-borrow-
ing countries vary. In a number of MDBs where the United 
States is absent, the model is closer to a credit cooperative 
(EIB, CAF, NDB) than a creditor-lender institution (World 
Bank, AsDB, IADB).
Third, the model varies according to the roles of boards 
of directors, with the key distinction between institutions 
that employ resident boards of directors and those that rely 
on nonresident boards. In both cases, the board comprises 
shareholder representatives (Table A6.2). 
Under the resident board model, first established at the 
World Bank at its founding, board members are full-time 
employees of the institution but selected by the shareholders 
as delegates for purposes of day-to-day decision making and 
deliberations. Resident boards meet within the institutions 
routinely, typically 2–3 days each week. Nonresident boards 
meet infrequently (monthly or quarterly) and typically are 
designees of the country governors, with responsibilities that 
extend beyond their MDB board functions. 
Leadership selection rules and outcomes also vary con-
siderably across the MDBs (Table A6.3). The World Bank 
has always had an American president, nominated by the 
United States, despite rules that allow for nominations from 
all member countries. The outcome at the World Bank has 
long been understood to follow an informal understanding 
between the United States and leading European countries 
that the World Bank presidency would be “reserved” for the 
United States nominee, while the head of the IMF would be 
a European nominee. In 2010 and 2011, other shareholders 
in both institutions revealed growing dissatisfaction with 
this informal arrangement by nominating and supporting 
competing candidates.
Beyond this informal practice, the World Bank distin-
guishes itself from the other MDBs by empowering the resi-
dent board of directors to select the president through a simple 
majority vote. Most other MDBs require governors’ votes, and 
typically special majorities of governors, to select the president.
The recommendations of the High-Level Commission 
on Modernization of World Bank Group Governance (the 
Zedillo Commission) were made in October 2009 and are 
reprinted here:
The five main measures recommended in the report have a 
unifying logic. They are mutuallyreinforcing and interdepen-
dent—they will only have their intended effect if they are adopted 
and implemented as a single package.
Recommendation 1. Enhance voice and participation
• Board consolidation. The Commission recommends adopting 
a Board of Directors that is relatively compact and therefore 
more efficient and effective. The World Bank Group’s Board 
should be reduced in size to 20 chairs from the current 25. 
Board consolidation should be achieved in part by reducing 
the number of European chairs by no less than four. 
• Elected chairs. The Board should eventually be composed 
entirely of elected chairs representing multicountry constitu-
encies. To that end, the five currently appointed chairs should 
be transformed into elected chairs, and a ceiling should be 
placed on the number of countries in each constituency (for 
example, ten per constituency) to ensure a more even distri-
bution of members across the groups.
• Allocation of voting power. The Commission recommends 
that the following principles govern the allocation of voting 
power at the IBRD, IFC, and IDA:
• Automatic shareholding reviews (to take place every five 
years) should be introduced in the IBRD and IFC to ensure 
that the shareholding structures are dynamic and keep up 
with changes in the global economy and in the circum-
stances of member countries. 
• The historical link between IMF quotas and IBRD share-
holding and voting power allocation should be abandoned. 
Bank specific principles and formulas for shareholding 
should be developed, along with a transitional arrange-
ment for their gradual implementation.
• With or without the introduction of a Bank specific share-
holding formula, the share of basic votes in total voting 
power at the IBRD and IFC should be raised and fixed 
at a level much closer to what it was when the organiza-
tions were created—10.78 percent at the IBRD and 12.28 
percent at the IFC. 
• The balance in voting power between developed and devel-
oping countries in the IBRD and IFC should be re exam-
ined, with a view toward achieving an even split between 
the two groups of countries in the IBRD and IFC. Once 
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reached, this principle for allocation should remain flexible 
enough to adapt to changes in the global economy and to 
the migration of countries from one category to another. 
• In IDA, voting power allocation should move away from 
the practice of weighting equally all contributions regard-
less of age. An appropriate discount factor should be intro-
duced so that relatively recent contributions receive more 
weight than old ones when allocating voting power. This 
will make the system fairer and encourage contributions.
• The majority required for amending the IBRD’s Articles 
of Agreement should be lowered from 85 to 80 percent.  
Recommendation 2. Restructure the WBG’s governing bodies
Table A6.3: Presidency
President Eligibility Selection
WB Jim Yong Kim
First term 2012–17
Member country nationals Selected by simple majority of the Board of Directors. To 
date, always an American president.
AsDB Takehiko Nakao
First term 2012–17
Must be a national of a 
regional member country
The Board of Governors, by a vote of a majority of the 
total number of Governors, representing not less than 
a majority of the total voting power of the members. To 
date, always a Japanese president.
IADB Luis Alberto Moreno
Second term 2005–15
No nationality requirements The Board of Governors, by a majority of the total voting 
power of the member countries, including an absolute 
majority of the governors of regional members.
EBRD Sir Suma Chakrabarti
First term 2012–16
No nationality requirements The Board of Governors, by a vote of a majority of the 
total number of Governors, representing not less than a 
majority of the total voting power of the members.
AfDB Akinwumi Adesina
First term 2015–20
Must be a national of a 
regional member country
The Board of Governors shall elect by a majority of the 
total, including a majority of the total voting power of the 
regional members.
EIB Werner Hoyer
First term 2012–18
Must be a national of a 
regional member country
The nine Management Committee members are 
appointed by the Board of Governors, on a proposal from 
the Board of Directors. 
IsDB Admad Mohamed Ali
1975–present
National of member country The Board of Governors, by a vote of a majority of the 
total number of Governors, representing not less than 
two-thirds of the total voting power of the members. To 
date, always a Saudi president.
CAF Enrique Garcia
Fourth term 2011–16
No nationality requirements Designated by the Board of Directors.
AIIB Jin Liqun
First term 2015–20
Must be a national of a 
regional member country
Super majority vote of Board of Governors (therefore 
subject to veto of largest shareholder).
NDB K. V. Kamath
First term 2015–20
Must be a national of a 
founding member country
Selected by the Board of Governors. 
Source: Articles of Agreement. 
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• Elevating the World Bank’s Board. The present Board of 
Executive Directors should be reconstituted as the World 
Bank Board. Directors should be ministers and their Alter-
nates officials at the deputy or viceministerial level. The 
responsibilities of the reconstituted World Bank Board would 
include selecting, appointing, and (if required) dismissing the 
President; setting the Group’s overall strategy and direction, 
taking into account proposals from the President; making 
major policy decisions; and conducting general oversight of the 
institution, including periodically reviewing the President’s 
performance. The Board would meet a few times a year, rather 
than twice a week, as it currently does.
• Delegation to Management. Approval of all financing opera-
tions should be transferred to Management. This will enhance 
the institution’s flexibility and efficiency by reducing the num-
ber of steps necessary for loan approvals. It would also free up 
considerable Board and staff resources currently devoted to the 
Board review and approval process. Delegation would also 
increase accountability by eliminating the conflict of interest 
inherent in the Board’s co managerial role and by placing 
responsibility for financing operations unambiguously on the 
shoulders of Management. 
• An advisory Council of Representatives. To support the Board, 
an advisory group of officials should be organized as a Council 
of Representatives. Each constituency would select a repre-
sentative through a process to be determined internally by 
each constituency. Representatives should fulfill professional 
qualifications agreed by the Board. Decision making author-
ity would remain exclusively with the Board.
• The Council’s responsibilities would include reviewing 
briefing papers and related documentation necessary for 
meetings of the Board and its committees; advising the 
Board on issues of oversight and the performance of the 
risk management units; and discussing and advising the 
Board on issues of development effectiveness and institu-
tional performance.
• The Commission recommends that the Council of Repre-
sentatives be in residence at the Bank’s headquarters for 
a transition period of up to five years. If the accountabil-
ity framework and processes for rigorous oversight of the 
institution’s activities are in place by then, there may be no 
overwhelming reason why the Council of Representatives 
should remain in residency indefinitely at the Bank’s 
headquarters. 
• Chairing the Board. The restructured World Bank Board 
would select a chairman from among its members on a rotat-
ing basis. To ensure that the Board remains appropriately 
connected to the institution, the President would remain a 
non voting member of the Board.
Recommendation 3. Reform the leadership selection process
The Commission calls for a presidential selection process that 
is rules based, inclusive of the membership, and competitive. 
In addition:
• Nominations from all qualified candidates should be wel-
comed, regardless of nationality. Candidates should be spon-
sored by the government of a member country, though not 
necessarily by the government of the candidate’s own country 
of citizenship.
• The selection of the Executive Vice Presidents of both IFC and 
MIGA should continue to be led by the President, but the 
process should be rules based and competitive, without formal 
or informal restrictions on the nationality of the candidates. 
Descriptions and qualifications for both positions should be 
developed and approved by the Board.
Given the dual nature of the unwritten agreement that reserves 
the Bank presidency to a U.S. citizen and the IMF Managing 
Director position to a European national, it is important that 
the leadership selection processes in both institutions be reformed 
in parallel, facilitating the political bargain that will surely be 
required.
Recommendation 4. Strengthen management accountability 
The Commission recommends three measures for strengthening 
accountability:
• Presidential performance review. The Board should intro-
duce a framework for the annual performance review of the 
President. The framework should provide clear performance 
criteria, outline how the review process is to work, and propose 
how assessments should be translated into incentives. The 
performance review criteria should focus on the President’s 
implementation of Board approved strategies, on his or her 
conduct of the ordinary business of the Group, and on the 
quality of the Group’s outputs. 
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• Stronger safety net units. Several concrete measures should be 
adopted to strengthen the Group’s safety net units:
• An institutional review of the safety net units to assess 
overlaps, gaps, and inconsistencies should be undertaken 
and concluded in 2010. 
• The Board should revise the terms of reference of the Inde-
pendent Evaluation Group (IEG) to (1) require that a 
majority of IEG staff be recruited from outside the World 
Bank Group; (2) introduce cooling off periods of appro-
priate length to end the revolving door dynamic between 
regular IEG staff and World Bank staff; and (3) ensure 
that the IEG Director General no longer functions as a 
member of the Group’s Senior Management.
• A second external evaluation of the Institutional Integrity 
VicePresidency should be conducted within two years to 
ensure that the recommendations of the Independent Panel 
Review of the World Bank’s Department of Institutional 
Integrity (the Volcker Panel) have been fully and properly 
implemented and are producing the results intended by 
the Panel.
• As part of the institutional review of the safety net units, 
the Board should consider whether the IFC’s Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman should continue reporting to Man-
agement only, rather than to the Board. In addition, the 
Board should consider how best to ensure that the CAO 
has appropriate means to ensure that its recommendations 
are adopted and implemented by Management. 
• Access to external expertise. The Board should make more 
extensive use of external evaluations to assess critical aspects of 
the Group’s activities, processes, strategies, and performance. 
Also, Board committees should have access to outside legal, 
accounting, and other expertise as appropriate to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties.
Recommendation 5. Strengthen the WBG’s resource base
• The Commission recommends strengthening the financial 
capacity of the World Bank Group. While the WBG has 
responded commendably to the crisis by increasing its lend-
ing levels to $100 billion over a three year period, its cur-
rent capital base has not expanded substantially. This means 
that after the three year period is over, the Bank will need 
to lower its lending to below the pre crisis level for several 
years. Shareholders will have to decide how best to achieve 
a recapitalization of the institution, and which parts of the 
Group to prioritize in this endeavor.
Finally, the question of shareholding reform looks very different 
between the World Bank and the regional development banks. 
The issue has received much less attention at the regional institu-
tions beyond ad hoc consideration of new members. China, in 
particular, has triggered a number of these discussions in recent 
years, with successful membership outcomes at the IADB, the 
AfDB, and the EBRD.
The World Bank’s position as a global institution has put 
added weight on the question of shareholding legitimacy from 
a global perspective. As a result, major shareholding review and 
reform exercises have occupied a great deal of attention within 
the institution, with one major round completed in 2010 and 
another round now under way.
The World Bank’s 2010 shareholding reform reallocated 
8 percent of voting power to developing countries, with China 
as the largest beneficiary. The group of 10 largest shareholders 
remained unchanged, although China jumped to the position of 
third largest shareholder, ahead of the large European countries.
As with the prior round, the current shareholding review is 
considering appropriate weights for measures that extend beyond 
economic size, such as weights associated with donor contribu-
tions to the bank, whether historical in the form of IDA contri-
butions, or prospective.
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